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ARTICLES
UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIES OF HOLY TRINITY:
SPIRIT, LETTER, AND HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Carol Chomsky*
In 1892, the Supreme Court construed the Alien Contract Labor Act of
1885, which barred importation of "any alien" under contract to perform
"labor or service of any kind," as not prohibiting a New York church from
hiring a British pastor to occupy its vacant pulpit. "[A] thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers," wrote Justice David Brewer in
Holy Trinity Church v. United States. Brewer's opinion is a touchstone
for those seeking to overcome plain statutory language, but is condemned by
those who disapprove of using legislative history and challenge Brewer's un-
derstanding of Congress's intent. Professor Chomsky argues that a complete
history of the case and statute reveals the Court was correct in its judgment
and Holy Trinity demonstrates the soundness of relying on legislative his-
tory to construe statutes properly.
INTRODUCTION
In 1887, the Reverend Doctor Edward Walpole Warren succeeded
Wilbur L. Watkins as rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity, an Episco-
pal church in New York City.1 Dr. Warren had spent part of the previous
year at the church in a preaching mission, but was a native of and resi-
dent in England at the time he was hired. Despite the unremarkable na-
ture of his employment contract, Dr. Warren found himself at the center
of a federal prosecution charging the church with a violation of the Alien
Contract Labor Act, which made it unlawful for any person, company,
partnership, or corporation:
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I presented a version of
this Article at a workshop at the University of Minnesota Law School and wish to thank my
colleagues, especially Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey, for their helpful comments.
William Eskridge also provided valuable suggestions. I have benefited from research help
from John Lacey and Jessica Durbin.
1. See James Elliott Lindsley, A History of Saint James' Church in the City of New
York, 1810-1960, at 51 (1960). A "small, but vocal, minority" at the church preferred to
recall as rector Stephen H. Tyng, Jr., who had helped found the church in 1864 and
stepped down as rector in 1881. Id. at 47-49, 51.
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to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage
the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any for-
eigner or foreigners, into the United States... under contract
or agreement ... made previous to the importation or migra-
tion of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform
labor or service of any kind in the United States .... 2
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York imposed the
required $1000 fine on the church 3 and, according to the church histo-
rian, Dr. Warren was ordered to return to England.4
The Church appealed to the United States Supreme Court which, in
February 1892, reversed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding
that the Alien Contract Labor Act did not apply to the contract between
the Church and its minister. 5 In a statement often since cited, Justice
David Brewer, speaking for a unanimous court, noted "the familiar rule
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its mak-
ers."6 Referring to the title of the Act, the "evil which was intended to be
remedied," the circumstances surrounding the enactment, and the com-
mittee reports, Justice Brewer concluded that Congress intended by the
Act to exclude cheap, unskilled laborers, not professional men such as
Dr. Warren, despite the breadth of the language used.7
Justice Brewer might have stopped there, having adequately (though
not unchallengeably) supported his construction of the statute.8 But
Brewer went on, in ringing language and at great length,9 to declare a
second reason that the Act should not be construed as including the con-
2. Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (amended 1887,
1888).
3. See United States v. Rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303, 303-04
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
4. See Lindsley, supra note 1, at 60. In 1887, when the original prosecution was
brought against Dr. Warren, no provision of the Alien Contract Labor Act authorized
deportation. As originally enacted, the statute imposed a fine on anyone importing an
alien in violation of the Act, but did not penalize the alien. See Alien Contract Labor Act
of 1885, § 3, 23 Stat. at 333. In 1887, the Act was amended to prevent the landing of an
immigrant if the violation was discovered before entry. See Act of Feb. 23, 1887, ch. 220,
§ 6, 24 Stat. 414, 415. In 1888, the Act was further amended to permit the Secretary of the
Treasury to arrest and deport any alien found to have entered in violation of the Act, for
up to a year from entry, see Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565, 566, but that
provision would not have been applicable to Dr. Warren.
5. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
6. Id. at 459.
7. Id. at 462-465. The Act prohibited the importation of "any alien or aliens, any
foreigner or foreigners... under contract or agreement.., to perform labor or service of any
kind .... " Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, § 1, 23 Stat. at 332 (emphasis added).
8. See infra Part II.
9. The portion described-the so-called "Christian nation" part of the opinion-
equals in length the entire exposition of the legislative history and its consequences for
interpretation of the Act. Compare Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 465-72 (Christian
nation), with id. at 457-65 (legislative history).
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tract with Dr. Warren. It could not be, he declared, that Congress would
have intended to prevent this particular kind of contract, no matter how
broad its language and its general effect. This was a contract to hire a
minister, and "no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to
any legislation, state or national, because," declared Justice Brewer, "this
is a religious people." 10 With examples ranging from the charge to Chris-
topher Columbus when he sailed westward, colonial charter documents,
the Declaration of Independence, the constitutions of various states, the
familiar oath of office ("so help me God"), and the opinions of no less an
authority than Chancellor Kent, to the "business" and "customs" of Amer-
ican life, Brewer found "a volume of unofficial declarations [and a] mass
of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation."1 ' With all this evi-
dence, "shall it be believed that a Congress of the United States intended
to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the
services of a Christian minister residing in another nation?... The con-
struction invoked cannot be accepted as correct."12
Brewer's declaration that the United States is a Christian nation had
little impact on the subsequent development of American law,13 but the
10. Id. at 465.
11. Id. at 471.
12. Id. at 471-72.
13. Justice Brewer later relied upon his own statement for the Court, noting in one of
his Haverford Library Lectures, somewhat disingenuously, "This republic is classified
among the Christian nations of the world. It was so formally declared by the Supreme
Court of the United States." David J. Brewer, The United States A Christian Nation 11
(John C. Winston Co. 1905). He disclaimed any notion that it was Christian "in the sense
that Christianity is the established religion or that the people are in any manner compelled
to support it" or "that all its citizens are either in fact or name Christians." Id. at 12.
Indeed, in Holy Trinity Church itself, Brewer included a "Jewish synagogue" when he listed
religious institutions with which Congress would never have intended interfering in their
selection of clergy. 143 U.S. at 472. Nonetheless, his proof of the "Christian nature" of the
country, both in Holy Trinity Church and in the more extended explanation in his lecture,
dealt not with the religious core of American values, but with the direct references to the
sectarian Christian foundations of the United States in colonial charters, state statutes,
judicial opinions, and public utterances. See id. at 466-71; Brewer, supra, at 12-39.
A few judges have followed Brewer's lead and concluded that America is at base not
just religious but Christian. Only months after the decision in Holy Trinity Church, the
Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico cited Brewer's statement in affirming a
conviction for selling liquor on a Sunday and declaring: "Whatever may be individual
opinions as to the question of religion, and the particular form of it known as
'Christianity,' yet the legal fact must be recognized by every one that this nation, and every
portion thereof, is nominally Christian." Cortesy v. Territory, 30 P. 947, 950 (N.M. 1892).
Interestingly, the court in Cortesy had to determine the scope of the portion of the Sunday
closings law that penalized any person who "engaged in any labor" on a Sunday. The court
did not cite Holy Trinity Church when it concluded that plain and unambiguous language
like "any labor" requires no interpretation, nor did the dissenting judge when he
concluded that the word labor meant "nothing more or less than manual, servile labor."
Id.
Half a century later, in Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. City of Hattiesburg, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a statute prohibiting theaters from showing movies
after 6:00 P.M. on Sundays by finding the Sunday closing laws to be of "divine origin" and
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citing Holy Trinity Church for establishing that "[ojur great country is denominated a
Christian nation." 49 So. 2d 574, 577 (Miss. 1950). That same year, the Superior Court of
New Jersey upheld a statute mandating the reading of at least five verses from the Old
Testament each day in public school and permitting recitation of the Lord's Prayer by
reference to, and substantial repetition of, Brewer's litany of proof that the United States
was founded in association with the Christian faith. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 71
A.2d 732, 734-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950).
More recently, when Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was asked by a Republican political
activist from Arizona to write a letter in support of a party resolution declaring the United
States a Christian nation based on the laws of the Bible, she cited Holy Trinity Church as
authority. See 2 Experts Fault O'Connor for Letter, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1989, at A3. In
1998, Judge Ray Moore of Alabama, challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union
because of his hand-made plaque of the Ten Commandments hanging behind his bench
and his practice of inviting clergy to lead prayer at the opening ofjury organizing sessions,
defended himself by citing Holy Trinity Church and its recognition that the United States is
a Christian nation. See Alabama ex rel. James v. ACLU, 711 So. 2d 952, 970 (Ala. 1998).
Other judges have cited Holy Trinity Church to support more generally the religious
and moral core of American values. Typical is the handling by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana. In Herold v. Parish Board of School Directors, the court used Brewer's strongly
worded statement of the Christian nature of American society on its way to concluding that
compelled reading of the Bible would unlawfully discriminate against Jewish students. 68
So. 116 (La. 1915). "There have been differences in expressions of opinion as to whether
this is a Christian land or not," the court said, but "there is not, and there has not been, a
question" that America is a "godly land" and that "we are a religious people." Id. at 119.
See also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931) (citing Holy Trinity Church for
the proposition that "[w]e are a Christian people ... according to one another the equal
right of religious freedom . . . ."); United States v. Patterson, 201 F. 697, 716 (S.D. Ohio
1912) (declining to decide whether the United States is a Christian nation, as Brewer
declared, but citing Holy Trinity Church in concluding that there is a moral basis to the
antitrust laws because "dealings between man and man must be in terms ofjustice"); Engel
v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (upholding law
mandating opening school prayer by quoting the statement in Zorach v. Clayson, 343 U.S.
306, 313 (1952) that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being," and noting this to be a paraphrase of the Supreme Court's similar assertion in 1892
in Holy Trinity Church).
In more recent cases, a few judges have criticized Brewer's narrow vision or noted the
social changes that make his declaration unseemly today. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 717-18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling the Court's approval of the public
display of a creche "a long step backwards to the days when Justice Brewer could arrogantly
declare for the Court that 'this is a Christian nation'"); United States v. Johnson, 25 F.3d
1335, 1341 (6th Cir. 1994) (Nelson,J., dissenting) ("A century ago, when Church of the Holy
Trinity was decided, the kind of cultural diversity that now characterizes our nation and its
public servants still lay in the future. It was thus still possible to suggest ... that 'this is a
Christian nation.'"); ACLU of Illinois v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir.
1986) (noting that "[a]s late as 1892 the Supreme Court could state in the manner of a
truism, 'this is a Christian nation,'" but finding America and the Supreme Court had
changed so substantially that a city could not constitutionally display a Latin cross during
the Christmas season). Similarly, Justice O'Connor was widely criticized for her letter
citing Holy Trinity Church for calling the United States a Christian nation. See, e.g., Alan
Dershowitz, A "Christian Nation": O'Connor's Letter Aids Religious Bigots, Seattle Times,
Apr. 17, 1989, at A7 (arguing that country has changed dramatically since 1892 and that
the Supreme Court has recognized this change, and adding "Were O'Connor a law
student, she would have received a D-minus for her answer."); Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Justice
O'Connor's Unfortunate Letter, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1989, at C7 (O'Connor's letter
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case became, and remains, an often-cited statement of one of the main
tenets of statutory interpretation: that the express words of a statute must
be read with the legislature's purpose in mind, and circumstances literally
within the statute may yet be excluded from its purview if such exclusion
better fulfills the purpose. The case is, as well, a frequent target of those
who challenge interpretations that venture beyond statutory text to im-
plement legislative purpose. Justice Kennedy has referred to the "un-
happy genesis" of the doctrine and its "unwelcome potential," and de-
scribed the methodology of Holy Trinity Church as "rummag[ing] through
unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order
to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the
Court is more comfortable."14 The "problem with spirits," he said, "is
that they tend to reflect less the views of the world whence they come
than the views of those who seek their advice."15 Justice Scalia considers
Holy Trinity Church to be "the prototypical case involving the triumph of
supposed 'legislative intent' (a handy cover for judicial intent) over the
text of the law." 16 Holy Trinity Church is cited to the Supreme Court, he
says, "whenever counsel wants us to ignore the narrow, deadening text of
the statute, and pay attention to the life-giving legislative intent. It is
nothing but an invitation to judicial lawmaking."1 7 To Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the case "has always meant we're going to legislate a little. It
means that you can't really get the meaning you want out of the stat-
ute."' 8 Acknowledging just these attitudes, Professor Philip Frickey tells
his students that "Holy Trinity Church is the case you always cite when the
statutory text is hopelessly against you."19
Because Brewer's opinion referred to the House and Senate commit-
tee reports accompanying the Alien Contract Labor Act, Holy Trinity
Church is also frequently credited, or blamed, for changing the rules on
the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. In a recent article
in the Stanford Law Review, Adrian Vermeule cites the case as "elevat[ing]
resulted in "political embarrassment"; "[v]iewed in the most favorable light, th[e]
rhetorical affirmation [of Holy Trinity that we are a Christian people] ... had no more
historical validity because it was pronounced in the Supreme Court than if it had been
shouted from a soapbox in Lafayette Park"). O'Connor expressed regret that her letter "to
an acquaintance .. .was used in a political debate." Arizona Furor Over Justice's Letter
About Christianity, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 16, 1989, at A14 (ellipsis in original).
For a thorough description of the context and aftermath ofJustice Brewer's "Christian
nation" dictum, see Steven K. Green, Justice David Josiah Brewer and the "Christian
Nation" Maxim, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 427 (1999).
14. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989).
15. Id.
16. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 18
(1997).
17. Id. at 21.
18. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (No.
95-1605), available at 1996 WL 723377, at *28.
19. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241, 247 (1992).
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legislative history to new prominence by overturning the traditional rule
that barred judicial recourse to internal legislative history."20 Holy Trinity
Church became, he says, a crucial turning point in judicial use of legisla-
tive history to "endorse[ ] countertextual interpretive techniques." 21 Wil-
liam Eskridge says the case "was a sensation" with respect to the use of
legislative history. 22 More moderately, Lawrence Solan writes that Holy
Trinity Church "presaged a gradual change" in Supreme Court statutory
interpretation methodology, serving as a bridge between scattered early
cases in which there was some Supreme Court reliance on legislative his-
tory and the increasing use of such history over the next several
decades. 23
Part of the notoriety of Holy Trinity Church lies in the general belief,
held by both those who approve and those who disapprove the invocation
of spirit and legislative intent, that Brewer was wrong in construing the
intent of the Congress that passed the Alien Contract Labor Act, and that
he indeed used legislative intent as a subterfuge for imposing his own
meaning on the words of the statute. After reviewing a more extensive
legislative history of the Act than Brewer apparently did,24 Vermeule is
convinced that Congress intended just what it said-to bar the importa-
tion of individuals under contract to perform "labor or service of any
kind." When Brewer, writing for the Court, declared that the spirit or
intention of the statute should prevail over the literal words, Vermeule
says, he was describing a nonexistent conflict. Scalia also doubts that the
decision somehow "produced the unexpressed result actually intended by
Congress."25 Ronald Dworkin, who disagrees with much else about
Scalia's statutory interpretation methodology, apparently agrees with his
20. Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1833, 1835 (1998). Vermeule
acknowledges that "a few prior [Supreme Court] opinions had quietly breached the
traditional rule," but still credits Holy Trinity Church with transforming the terrain by giving
legislative history significant weight in overcoming statutory text. Id. at 1836 & n.14.
21. Id. at 1836.
22. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 209 (1994)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Statutory Interpretation].
23. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 57,
99-101 (1998).
24. Brewer quoted from a Senate committee report and referred generally to the
'petitions . ..and ... the testimony presented before the committees of Congress."
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464 (1892). Brewer may have
simply relied upon the portions of the legislative history cited to him by counsel for the
Church, since the brief referred both to the Senate Committee Report and to testimony
before the Senate Committee on Labor. See Brief for the Plaintiff in Error at 18-22,
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (No. 13,166). Vermeule
cites only a few other portions of the legislative debate, see Vermeule, supra note 20, at
1843-44, 1846-53, though he apparently reviewed most or all of it in reaching his
conclusion. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich. L.
Rev. 1509, 1536-40 (1998) [hereinafter Eskridge, Unknown Ideal] (discussing Vermeule's
"thorough legislative archeology").
25. Scalia, supra note 16, at 22.
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analysis of Holy Trinity Church, suggesting that "[t]here can be no serious
doubt that Congress meant to say what the words it used would naturally
be understood to say," even if the legislators "would have voted for an
exception for English priests."26 Eskridge, on the other hand, finds in
the legislative history evidence for competing interpretations of the stat-
ute, concluding that Holy Trinity Church "is a case where legislative history
does little work, beyond buttressing already-formed impressions." 27
As these recent references indicate, the meaning of the Holy Trinity
Church case and its use of legislative history remains a significant element
in the vigorous contemporary debate over statutory interpretation. Any
thorough analysis of the sources, meaning, and legitimacy of the invoca-
tion of spirit, legislative intent, and legislative history must therefore be
grounded in a thorough understanding of Holy Trinity Church, both the
history of the litigation and the history of statutory interpretation meth-
odology in which it was situated. This Article provides that historical con-
text and discusses its implications for the current debate about statutory
interpretation theory and methodology. In addition to describing in
depth the legislative and political history of the Alien Contract Labor
Act-so that the reader may make his or her own judgments about the
meaning-the sections below explore the circumstances leading to the
litigation as well as the jurisprudential context for Brewer's analysis.
Viewed in this broader landscape, Holy Trinity Church establishes the
importance of recourse to legislative history and affords a better founda-
tion for non-textualist approaches to statutory interpretation than its crit-
ics have acknowledged. Like many judicial opinions, Holy Trinity Church
is flawed in the presentation of its rationale. Brewer did not cite to the
existing judicial and other authority for his interpretive approach, nor
did he explore fully the legislative history available to him. But, at least by
my reading of the history, he reached the correct result, one that could
not have been reached by relying solely on the words that Congress
wrote. Legislating is itself a very imperfect process, and the tools that
Brewer used to understand its work product are vital if courts are to fully
and fairly apply the law. Both Brewer's interpretational methodology-
well-grounded in prior decisions-and his conclusions-amply sup-
ported in the full statutory history-represent responsible efforts to de-
termine the spirit and meaning of legislative language, not ill-considered
divinations from the spirit world.
No doubt my arguments about the meaning and significance of Holy
Trinity Church will neither settle the raging debate about the value or le-
gitimacy of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation nor
convince the critics of Holy Trinity Church that the decision is correct. At
the very least, however, this exploration of the history of the case will
enrich the discussion and make it harder to dismiss the case as an unfor-
26. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in Scalia, supra note 16, at 118.
27. Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 24, at 1540.
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tunate, dangerous, or even ridiculous example of blatantjudicial lawmak-
ing. Like the statute it construes, Holy Trinity Church cannot be taken at
face value. It must be understood in its own context. That, fundamen-
tally, is the aim of what follows.
I. CHwOic.LEs: THE HISTORY OF THE LAWSUIT
Holy Trinity Church, of which the Reverend Doctor Warren became
rector, was established in New York City in 1864 as a low-church alterna-
tive to the older Church of the Mediator.28 Its first rector was the Rever-
end Stephen H. Tyng, Jr., who as rector of the Church of the Mediator
encouraged the secession of Holy Trinity Church from its parent parish
and then joined the new facility. Under Dr. Tyng, who remained rector
until 1881, Holy Trinity Church focused much of its effort on missionary
outreach. It established five chapels, an orphanage, a training school for
lay preachers, dispensaries and infirmaries, a lodging house in the city,
and a convalescent home in the country. The church occupied a large
stone-and-brick structure on the comer of Madison Avenue and 42nd
Street, built in 1873 to accommodate the growing needs of the parish.29
When Dr. Tyng resigned in 1881, there may have been financial
trouble at the parish due to the ambitious activities carried on by the
chapels, and some parishioners were reportedly frustrated by Dr. Tyng's
continual battle against "ecclesiastical power" and ceremonialism in
church services. 30 Nonetheless, Dr. Tyng reported that the church had
operated in the previous year at a surplus, had reduced its debt, had two
thousand communicants, and was drawing large crowds to its services. In
the next several years, however, the neighborhood around the church
became increasingly commercial, and many of its parishioners were mov-
ing uptown and to other churches. "Dr. Tyng had resigned at the high
noon of the parish's prominence; the two rectors who followed him were
forced to face dwindling congregations and mounting costs."3 1
28. Lindsley, supra note 1, at 47. The history of Holy Trinity Church retold here is
drawn from Lindsley's book, unless otherwise indicated.
29. See id. at 47-49. Lindsley observes that the "style [of the building] was of the type
appreciated more then than now. The designs in its brickwork caused it to be popularly
known as 'the Church of the Holy Oilcloth."' Id. at 49.
30. See id. at 49-50. The quote is from Dr. Tyng's letter of resignation, in which he
laments that "our battles for principles are over" and states that "we are living in an era of
ecclesiastical power." Id. at 49.
31. Id. at 50-51. The newspaper reports of Dr. Warren's hiring in 1887 give a
somewhat different impression of the condition of the church several years after Dr. Tyng's
resignation, however. The New York Times reported that the church had 1200
communicants in 1887, more than in any other Episcopal church in the city except Trinity
and Grace. See The Call Accepted, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1887, at 8. By the early 1890s,
however, the continued financial viability of Holy Trinity Church was uncertain.
Beginning in 1893, steps were first taken towards what would become, in 1895, a merger
between Holy Trinity Church and St. James' Church, a large and wealthy Episcopal parish.
The merger permitted the combined church both to minister to congregants and to carry
on Holy Trinity Church's significant work among the poor. Under the terms of the
[Vol. 100:901
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In 1887, Dr. Tyng's successor resigned to lead a church in Philadel-
phia. To replace him, the Trustees of Holy Trinity Church turned to a
man who had visited the church in December 1885 as part of a group of
English missionaries whose members had preached in most of the Episco-
pal churches during Advent season that year. 32 Dr. Warren had "made a
profound impression upon his congregations" during that visit:
33
When he came-open-faced, hearty, and whole-souled-it re-
quired but a glance to see that he was a master of his work. He
soon became in universal demand, and, with from four to seven
services a day, it was a marvel how he continued to see everybody
who called, prepare his sermons, and get even a fragment of
necessary rest. Once the incumbent of one of the most desira-
ble parishes in England, he voluntarily surrendered it that he
might devote his time to the poor of London.3 4
Dr. Warren was about 50 years old, married, with a son and two daugh-
ters; he was "of medium size, of strong English physique, and a pleasant
open face, which bears the impress of character and positiveness. He
wears short Dundreary whiskers, but no mustache .... His manners are
engaging."3 5 He was reported to be "of fine presence and pleasing man-
ners, an earnest and eloquent orator and of remarkable executive ability.
He belongs to the low church party of the Church of England, or, as he
himself says, 'I am a moderate churchman.' . . . [H]is salary," said the
newspaper, "will be whatever he may desire it to be."3 6
Despite these encomiums, the selection of Dr. Warren was not en-
tirely without controversy. A small but vocal minority apparently wanted
to recall Stephen Tyng, and the former rector fully expected to be sum-
moned. When the Trustees instead chose Dr. Warren, Dr. Tyng "steamed
off for Europe, declaring to the press that upon his return he would es-
tablish an Episcopal church according to his standards. '37 When Warren
arrived on September 23, 1887, he was asked about the plans of Dr. Tyng
to found another church "with the view of drawing away a large part of
your congregation."3 8 A spokesman for Holy Trinity Church said it
would make "little difference .... All of Dr. Tyng's closer friends have
merger, the Holy Trinity Church building was sold, with the proceeds applied to endow a
new mission church further uptown, and Dr. Warren became rector of the now larger St.
James' Church parish. See Lindsley, supra note 1, at 52-58.
32. See The Call Accepted, supra note 31, at 8.
33. Id.
34. A Preacher From London, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1887, at 8.
35. Id.
36. The Call Accepted, supra note 31, at 8.
37. Lindsley, supra note 1, at 51.
38. A Preacher from London, supra note 34, at 8. One day later, the New York Times
printed a letter from Dr. Tyng announcing that he had postponed the resumption of
ministerial duties in New York and the organization of a new parish "which would be very
likely to draw many of its members from his former flock." The Old and New Pastor, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 1887, at 8. A church officer denied the impact of any return by Dr. Tyng.
Most of Dr. Tyng's close friends had left the church, he said. "In fact, death recently
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withdrawn from the church already.... We believe and trust that our
troubles are now all ended, and do not wish to say anything that will re-
call them."3 9 Dr. Tyng's supporters apparently tried to obtain a building
for him, but their actions were discouraged by the Bishop, and "after
some time the matter was closed." 40
The major controversy to surround Dr. Warren, however, was not the
dispute with Dr. Tyng but rather the prosecution of his employer for in-
viting him to be rector in alleged violation of the Alien Contract Labor
Act. The challenge to the actions of the church was reported in the New
York Times on September 25, 1887, only two days after Dr. Warren's trium-
phant arrival, 4 1 and the lawsuit was filed less than a month later. Profes-
sor Adrian Vermeule describes the lawsuit against Holy Trinity Church as
a collusive and nonadversarial challenge brought by John S. Kennedy, "a
Presbyterian gentleman connected with the Rev. Dr. John Hall's
church." 42 Vermeule relies on an article in the New York Daily Tribune
which reported Warren's statements about the lawsuit:
The suit was an entirely friendly one, [Warren says he was told,]
and Mr. Kennedy's object was to make odious the attempt to
apply the law to clergymen and other men of the same class.
[Kennedy] said that if he won the case he would pay the fine of
$1,000 imposed. I think that he paid all the expenses of the
defence, but I am not sure.... Mr. Kennedy begged us to try
the case squarely on the merits to the end, and not try to have it
dismissed on any side issue, as might have been done. On sev-
eral grounds we might have had the case dismissed, but instead
we defended it simply on the ground that the Contract Labor
Law did not apply to clergymen. 43
A review of contemporaneous reports on the litigation confirms that
the suit was instigated by John Stewart Kennedy, a prominent banker,
financier, and railroad director, 44 but that examination also reveals a
somewhat more complicated story than reflected in the single New York
Daily Tribune report cited by Vermeule. Kennedy set the legal wheels in
motion in a letter he wrote on September 22, 1887, to Daniel Magone,
Collector of United States Customs in New York, republished in the New
removed the last prominent member of our church who was identified with Dr. Tyng's
cause." Id.
39. A Preacher from London, supra note 34, at 8.
40. Lindsley, supra note 1, at 51.
41. See Importing a Rector, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1887, at 2.
42. Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1840 (quoting The Right to Import Rectors, N.Y.
Daily Trib., Mar. 1, 1892, at 2).
43. Id. at 1840 (quoting The Right to Import Rectors, supra note 42, at 2). William
Popkin was the first to discover the newspaper references that suggested collusion. See
William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political Language and the Political Process
230 (2d ed. 1997).
44. See Holy Trinity To Be Sued, N.Y. Daily Trib., Oct. 14, 1887, at 8; see also George
Austin Morrison, Jr., History of St. Andrew's Society of the State of New York, 1756-1906,
at 123-30 (1906) (biographical sketch of Kennedy).
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York Times on September 25, 1887. His reasons for challenging the hiring
of Dr. Warren, at least as expressed in that letter and in subsequent re-
ports, differ somewhat from those reported indirectly by Warren:
In calling your attention to this matter I desire distinctly to say
that I have nothing whatever against Mr. Warren, and feel that
the enforcement of the law against him will be a great hardship
not only to him, but to the people who called him. Neverthe-
less, as the law stands, I do not see how any exception can be
made in his favor, and as President of the St. Andrew's Society in
this city I feel greatly aggrieved at the manner in which this law
has been enforced against countrymen of mine who, if they had
been allowed to land would have made most valuable citizens,
and my only object in serving this notification upon you is in
order to make this a test case, and by enforcing a most obnox-
ious and unreasonable law I hope thereby it will lead to its total
abrogation. 45
"I do not see why the Rev. Mr. Warren should be exempted" from the law
used against other contract laborers, Kennedy later said.46 "The law is
nothing better than a sop to the Knights of Labor."47
Clearly Kennedy was a man on a mission: He indicated to Magone
that he had already obtained a legal opinion on the proper interpretation
of the Act before raising the matter with the authorities. James Elliott
Lindsley, in his history of Saint James' Church, with which Holy Trinity
Church merged in 1895, suggests a somewhat different motive for Ken-
nedy. He reports that Kennedy disliked the law because an English gar-
dener he had hired was ordered back to England by the courts for violat-
ing the Alien Contract Labor Act. When a short time later Kennedy read
in the papers that Dr. Warren was coming to America under contract to
be the rector of Holy Trinity Church, Lindsley says, Kennedy decided to
test the legality of the contract labor law.48
45. Importing a Rector, supra note 41, at 2. The St. Andrew's Society was a mutual
benefit and charitable organization established in New York in 1756 to support natives of
Scotland who emigrated to the United States. See Morrison, supra note 44, at 7-11.
Kennedy was its president from 1879 to 1882 and 1884 to 1887. See id. at 123. His attitude
may also have been shaped by the fact that he himself first emigrated to the United States
under contract with a London trade firm to be their resident representative in America.
See id.
46. Mr. Kennedy in Earnest, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1887, at 4. "I see no reason ... why
a law should be enforced in the case of a poor gardener or mechanic and should not be
enforced in the case of the chosen head of a rich city congregation," Kennedy wrote in his
letter asking Secretary of the Treasury Fairchild to charge Holy Trinity Church with
violation of the law. Holy Trinity To Be Sued, supra note 44, at 8.
47. Mr. Kennedy in Earnest, supra note 46, at 4. It is certainly true that organized
labor was a primary supporter of the legislation. See text accompanying infra note 114.
48. See Lindsley, supra note 1, at 59-60. Although Lindsley states this version of the
story with some certainty, he cites no authority for the fact. Perhaps Lindsley's gardener
was actually the "Scotch agricultural laborer Cummings" sent back to Scotland by Collector
Magone to whom Kennedy referred in a subsequent interview. See Mr. Kennedy in
Earnest, supra note 46, at 4; see also Holy Trinity To Be Sued, supra note 44, at 8 (noting
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Whatever Kennedy's motives may have been, the New York Times
agreed with Kennedy's stated assessment that the law was unreasonable in
all its aspects, not only as enforced against Holy Trinity Church. With
tongue planted firmly in cheek, and displaying the prejudices enacted
into an earlier piece of exclusionary legislation, 49 an editorial published
the same day as Kennedy's letter called Warren a "'coolie' clergyman"
and said he would "in a week or two begin his unholy work of undermin-
ing our institutions by performing the 'contract labor' for the perform-
ance of which he was imported."50 If only Kennedy had written before
Warren had landed, the Times said, the Collector of the Port might simply
have notified the ship master that "he had been conveying a pernicious
and unlawful immigrant, a kind of human dynamite, and to warn that
astonished skipper to take back the dangerous exile whence he came." 5 1
The law was, indeed, being violated, the Times concluded:
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the emigration of a foreign cler-
gyman to this country, under a call from an American parish, is
a violation of the law, and we must applaud the purpose of Mr.
Kennedy to enforce the law in a case where its enforcement will
be a riotous travesty upon sense and justice. The law is no re-
specter of parsons, and what is sauce for the agricultural and
manufacturing goose must be sauce also for the theological
gander. 5 2
But perhaps, the Times archly suggested, an "astute lawyer" might claim
that the new rector was a workman in a new industry for which skilled
labor was not otherwise available, one of the recognized exceptions to the
ban on importation:
[I]f it can be shown that there is anything peculiar in Mr. War-
ren's theology, and that it is not now inculcated from the Ameri-
can pulpit, he might come in as the practitioner of a new indus-
try. Congress has no objection to heresiarchs any more than to
Anarchists or dynamiters, so long as they do not compete with
talent native or already established. 53
that the case of "the canny Scotch gardener, M. Cummings" had attracted Kennedy's
notice). Cummings, however, was not a personal gardener. He was, rather, hired by a
lawyer in Kentucky to work as a farm servant or dairyman, to be in charge of a herd of 25
Jerseys. His entry was denied by the Collector, and the circuit court later upheld the
Collector's decision. See In re Cummings, 32 F. 75 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887). Cummings, and
his employer, learned from the experience. When Cummings returned to the United
States after being excluded, he did so without a guaranteed contract. See Mr. Kennedy in
Earnest, supra note 46, at 4. He now "is probably watering the grounds of the Kentucky
gentleman who wanted him at first," suggested the New York Daily Tribune. Holy Trinity To
Be Sued, supra note 44, at 8.
49. See infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
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Adopting a slightly more serious tone, the editorialist finally got to the
point:
Seriously, nothing could be better adapted to show the com-
plete absurdity of the law than this proposition to use it against a
man who is in all senses a welcome and valuable citizen. For the
terms of the law do apparently exclude Mr. Warren, while they
do not exclude the hundreds of Neapolitan paupers and
criminals on board the Alesia, who are detained at present be-
cause they have brought cholera to the country, but are not de-
tained when they bring only idleness and crime. If such a con-
tract cannot induce Congress to revise the outrageous statute
invoked by Mr. Kennedy the case for its revision is hopeless. 54
The challenge to Dr. Warren's employment continued to be a source of
comment when his clerical activities were discussed in the newspaper. In
December, for instance, in an article discussing Dr. Warren's views on
observance of a Sunday day of rest, the Times commented that Dr. War-
ren "has not, like some other representatives of imported contract labor,
brought with him loose ideas of the use of the Sunday."5 5
Church services were well-attended at Holy Trinity Church the day
the lawsuit was reported in the newspaper, and the Times noted it was a
"new experience" and a "novelty" for the parishioners to be charged with
trying to break the nation's laws.56 William C. Browning, "an officer of
the church, and one of its leading members," told the Times he did not
think there had been a violation of the law.5 7 Misreading the statute as
establishing a violation only if the employer prepaid the immigrant's pas-
sage, he said that "of course, Mr. Warren paid his own way across the
ocean and came here just as any other traveler would."5 8 He also claimed
that Warren was not under contract:
"No contract was signed, then," he was asked.
"Certainly not."
Mr. Browning explained that the minister came here with
the understanding that if he decided to accept the Rectorship of
Holy Trinity Parish he was to receive a stated salary. If he did
not care to accept the call he had the right to decline the posi-
tion offered him. The officers of the church will take care that
the legal side of their case is well attended to.5 9
54. Id.
55. Dr. Warren Qualifies His Views, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1887, at 2.
56. The Old and New Pastor, supra note 38, at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. One of the trustees (perhaps Browning) was reported as indicating that
"Bishop Potter at the recent Diocesan Convention put the matter in its proper light when
he said in his address to the congregation that no contract is made with an Episcopal
minister until he has been at least six months a rector in a church." Holy Trinity To Be
Sued, supra note 44, at 8. As Kennedy concluded, however, the described "understanding"
between Dr. Warren and Holy Trinity Church-that if he chose to answer the call he would
be paid, even if an official contract was not signed until sometime later-was probably
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Meanwhile, Dr. Warren began his service to Holy Trinity Church,
preaching his first sermon on October 2, 1887. Dr. Warren was reported
to have made
a very favorable impression upon his hearers. He spoke, without
manuscript, fluently and earnestly, his voice easily filling the
great room. He speaks English in the English way, of course,
and perhaps some of his hearers in the galleries found it diffi-
cult to understand him at times, for he is one of the most rapid
speakers among the clergymen of the city.60
Ironically-perhaps intentionally so-in view of the controversy over his
ministry, Dr. Warren took for his text Acts 10:29: "Therefore came I unto
you without gainsaying, as soon as I was sent for; I ask, therefore, for what
intent ye have sent for me?" 6 1
Meanwhile, Mr. Kennedy continued to press his challenge to Dr.
Warren and the Alien Contract Labor Act. Collector Magone indicated
he did not think he had authority to act in the case,62 so Kennedy took
his complaint to the Secretary of the Treasury. In response, Assistant Sec-
retary of the Treasury Maynard told Kennedy that only the district attor-
ney could enforce the law once the alien had landed. Undeterred, Ken-
nedy "descended upon United States District Attorney Stephen A.
Walker."6 3 At the same time, Kennedy wrote to Adon Smith, the Presi-
dent of the Board of Directors of Holy Trinity Church, hoping, it appears,
both to maintain friendly relations with the Church and to ensure an
adequate challenge to the law:
I feel that my motives in this matter have been thoroughly ap-
preciated by yourself and other members of your congregation,
sufficient to constitute a "contract... to perform labor or service" in violation of the Act.
Mr. Kennedy in Earnest, supra note 46, at 4. But see United States v. Edgar, 48 F. 91 (8th
Cir. 1891) (Alien Contract Labor Act not violated because exchange of correspondence
did not create a contract; laborer in England had to arrive in United States in order to
form contract). The claim that no contract existed with Dr. Warren was not pressed in
argument before either the circuit court or the Supreme Court.
60. Pleased With Their Rector, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1887, at 2.
61. Id. The speaker in Acts 10:29 is Peter, who asks the question of Cornelius, a
Gentile who sent for Peter to preach to him and his household after receiving a vision from
God. Given the race and class prejudice evident in the enactment of the Alien Contract
Labor Act, see infra notes 118-123, it is noteworthy that the theme of Acts 10 is Peter's
recognition that "God has shown me that I should not call any man common or unclean."
Acts 10:28.
62. See Mr. Kennedy in Earnest, supra note 46, at 4. Magone was correct about his
lack of authority. Even if the importation of Dr. Warren was illegal, once an alien was
admitted to the United States, the Collector of Customs had no further role in
enforcement and no authority to act against either the alien or the employer. See supra
note 4. Magone may also have been making a substantive point about the scope of the Act.
On October 14, the New Yor* Times reported that Magone "was nonplused. He gave the
question his attention, however, but decided that theology and ministers of the gospel
were products over which he had no control." The Imported Minister, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14,
1887, at 1.
63. The Imported Minister, supra note 62, at 1.
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and I shall rely upon you to aid the District Attorney in present-
ing the facts to the court without legal technicalities, so that the
law can be fairly tested. If, as the result of such a trial, the pen-
alty of $1,000 should be collected from the church, it is my in-
tention to contribute that amount to its treasury.64
Smith expressed doubt that the lawsuit against the Church would accom-
plish much towards repeal of the law. "People might scent something
rediculous [sic] in such a case," he said, and a successful prosecution of
the church would likely be "the end of the whole matter."65
Only a week after Kennedy's letter to him, Walker replied that he
would, indeed, prosecute the suit. In a remarkably thorough review of
the central arguments that would ultimately be made, given the short
time that had elapsed, Walker wrote to Kennedy:
Notwithstanding first impressions to the contrary, I have
reached the conclusion that the case presented is within the stat-
ute and that it is my duty to bring suit.... The statute prescribes
that the labor or service referred is labor or service of "any
kind." This cannot mean manual labor service simply, for the
terms are of the broadest character, and moreover the excep-
tions mentioned in the act exclude the idea that its general pro-
visions relate to mechanical or industrial labor alone. The ex-
ceptions pertinent to be noted are, among others, "professional
actors, artists, lecturers, or singers." None of these excepted
cases would be regarded as belonging to the manual labor class,
and the conclusion is inevitable that if not excepted they would
fall within the terms of the law.
The case you present is therefore clearly within the bald
and remorseless letter of the statute, and it remains to be seen
whether the broader basis of interpretation, popularly known as
"the spirit of the act" or "presumed legislative intent," excludes
its application to the case which you present.66
Mr. Walker, it appears, also shared Kennedy's appraisal that the effort to
exclude alien contract laborers was bad public policy:
Mr. Walker's opinion of the law is that it is an effort to apply the
doctrine of the protective tariff to the commodity known as la-
64. Id. Kennedy expressed similar sentiments in his letter to Secretary Fairchild:
I need hardly add to the assurance contained in my letter to the Collector that I
take this action with the kindest feelings toward the Rev. Mr. Warren and toward
his congregation, which numbers several of my personal friends, and solely for
the purpose of calling public attention to what I believe to be an unjust and
unreasonable law.
Holy Trinity To Be Sued, supra note 44, at 8.
65. The Imported Minister, supra note 62, at 1.
66. Id. Mr. Walker concluded that, as to "this sort of legislation" (protective
legislation akin to tariff imposition), "any vagaries as to the spirit of the act or the intent of
the act are peculiarly inapplicable." Holy Trinity To Be Sued, supra note 44, at 8. It is
noteworthy that Walker so quickly raised the "spirit" versus "letter" issue, confirming that
the doctrine was well-established before the Supreme Court opinion in this case relied
upon it. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
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bor; it is protection for the sake of protection.... He thinks
[Congress might have made an exception for preaching, as it
had for lecturing, singing, and acting if] a committee of preach-
ers asked it to do so. The statute, he states, like every other stat-
ute in the tariff system, bears the ear marks of carelessness, self-
ish personal interest, and all manner of invidious
discrimination. 67
Walker followed through quickly, filing suit on October 21, 1887, in
the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. 68
The Church filed a demurrer, claiming the statute should be construed
to exclude the hiring of Dr. Warren from its scope. The demurrer was
argued on April 23, 1888, with Walker appearing for the prosecution and
Seaman Miller for the defense. 69 Miller focused on construing the words
of the statute in light of the purposes of the Act, arguing that "labor or
service of any kind" was to be given its
ordinary legislative significance. The meaning of the word la-
borer does not include that kind of mental and spiritual service
which a clergyman tenders his congregation .... The words 'of
any kind' were to be interpreted in the light of the history of the
times when the act was passed. At that time the mining and
railroad laborers were threatened by a wholesale invasion of
pauper manual laborers, and it was at this class the act was
aimed.70
In any case, Miller argued, if the Act did include clergymen, it would be
unconstitutional. 7 1
67. The Imported Minister, supra note 62, at 1.
68. See Complaint at 3, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892) (No. 13,166); see also Suing Holy Trinity Church, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1887, at 3.
The suit was filed in the circuit court because the Alien Contract Labor Act specified that
fines for violation of the Act would be recoverable "as debts of like amount are now
recovered in the circuit courts of the United States." Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch.
164, § 3, 23 Stat. 332, 333. Cases in the circuit courts were heard either by United States
Supreme Court justices acting as circuit judges in their respective circuits, or by judges
specially appointed as circuit judges.
The suit against Holy Trinity Church was one of only 17 enforcement suits filed
nationwide under the Alien Contract Labor Act between its enactment on February 26,
1885, and the end of 1887, and the only such suit in the Southern District of New York for
that time period. Unlike a number of jurisdictions, in which prosecutors appeared to
target employers with multiple violations, thus fulfilling the stated purpose of halting large
scale contract labor importation (see infra notes 105-165 and accompanying text), all of
New York's prosecutions before early 1890 were apparently for single instances of violation.
See Letter from the Attorney General: Number of Suits Under Contract Labor Law, H.R.
Ex. Doc. No. 51-206, at 4-5.
69. See Parsons Need Protection, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1888, at 9.
70. Id. (paraphrasing Miller's argument).
71. See id.
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Walker's argument, while aimed in part at responding to Miller's dis-
cussion of the language, also displayed his disdain for the Act, no matter
how interpreted:72
The act was designed to be and is a drastic measure. With very
slight amendments it was passed in the form presented to Con-
gress by certain so-called labor organizations. Its emphatic and
sweeping words are not the work of trained statutory draughts-
men or persons learned in the law. Attempts have been made in
vain to have it remodeled by skillful hands, and it stands upon
the books to-day in substantially its original form.... The rever-
sal or checking of this American policy [of inducing emigration]
is due partly to the fear of the voting power of labor organiza-
tions as operating on, not to say terrorizing, our legislative as-
semblies. So in the last few years we have had a deluge of short-
hour laws, of holiday laws, all having their origin in pure defer-
ence to the voting power and independent of any just political
principle. Any measure having the indorsement of a labor or-
ganization must be carried through Congress as gingerly as eggs
in a basket. 73
72. In its contemporaneous editorial attacking "class legislation" of all kinds on behalf
of laborers, the New York Times said that "neither counsel [in the Holy Trinity Church
argument] concealed his contempt for the act of Congress and for the motives of the men
who passed it." The Times shared this sentiment:
It is very undesirable that the State of New York should be made ridiculous by the
acts of its Legislature. It is still more undesirable that the United States should be
made ridiculous by act of Congress. Yet this was done very effectually yesterday by
the argument in the case of the Rev. Walpole Warren ....
Class Legislation, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1888, at 4.
73. Parsons Need Protection, supra note 69, at 9 (quoting Assistant District Attorney
Walker). The prosecutor's attitude was not lost on the statute's labor supporters. During
the pendency of the Holy Trinity Church litigation, the House of Representatives held
hearings to investigate the level of enforcement of the immigration laws, including the
Alien Contract Labor Act. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of
Labor, testified that the prosecution of Holy Trinity Church was part of an effort "to bring
the law into odium and ridicule, and cause a revulsion of feeling among the citizens and
secure [the law's] repeal." H.R. Rep. No. 51-3472, at 91 (1890); see also H.R. Misc. Doc.
No. 50-572, at 402 (1889) (Testimony Taken by the Select Committee of the House of
Representatives to Inquire Into the Alleged Violation of the Laws Prohibiting the
Importation of Contract Laborers, Paupers, Convicts, and Other Classes) (testimony of
Gompers that the prosecution of the Church was "an attempt to bring the law into
ridicule .... [I] t was only done for the purpose of bringing that law into notoriety.").
Gompers compared these prosecutions to the failure to prevent "thousands and thousands
of [true] contract laborers landing every day . . . ." Id.
The House Committee concluded that the failure to prevent emigration of many
contract laborers was not due to "unfriendly administration of the law," but rather to the
near impossibility of detecting contract laborers during customs inspections, in part
because the aliens would come "coached" regarding what to say during their interviews.
H.R. Rep. No. 51-3472, supra, at v. Employers became adept at circumventing the law by
making abundant promises but entering no contracts, or by relying on advertisements for
laborers through employment agencies and in newspapers abroad. See id. at v-vi.
Moreover, coaching by powerful intermediary padrones succeeded in both circumventing
the contract labor law and establishing increased power for the padrones, who were
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Walker also argued that clergymen would benefit from the same kind of
protection from foreign competition that other workers wanted (no mat-
ter how ill-advised the policy of acceding to such demands):
In no department of service has competition been more active
than in clerical work. Our choicest and most desirable metro-
politan pulpits are invaded by the foreign product. Eight of the
best-paying and best-attended churches in New York are at the
present time served by imported... clergymen. Meanwhile our
theological seminaries, which are infant industries just as much
as carding machines or iron mills, are turning out annually
enough of this form of labor product to supply the home de-
mand, and meet the exigencies of missionary service also.
There are more Congregational ministers in the United States
not engaged in the work of their profession in proportion to
their numbers than there are carpenters or masons out of em-
ployment. Of the 4,090 Congregational ministers in the United
States in 1887, only 2,832 were engaged in pastoral work.7 4
As before, the New York Times echoed Walker's attacks on the Act:
It is monstrous that a clergyman should be prevented from com-
ing to this country to take charge of a parish. But it is no more
monstrous than that a gardener or a coachman or a domestic
servant should be prevented from coming for the express pur-
pose of hiring his services to an employer who is willing to make
an express agreement to take them, and who has advanced
money on that agreement. Members of Congress who voted for
the law under which it is sought to exclude Mr. Warren had no
intention of doing anything more than to avoid a political boy-
cott from the Knights of Labor among their constituents. They
may see in the contempt of the counsel in the Warren case the
light in which their action is regarded by sensible citizens, for
whose opinion they apparently care nothing. 75
Judge Wallace issued his ruling on the Church's demurrer on May
23, 1888, concluding that Holy Trinity Church had, indeed, hired Dr.
Warren in violation of the Alien Contract Labor Act.76 He acknowledged
important to both the employers and the contract laborers themselves. See Gunther Peck,
Reinventing Free Labor: Immigrant Padrones and Contract Laborers in North America,
1885-1925, 83 Am. Hist. 848, 853-855 (1996).
In contrast to the conclusions of the House Committee, others have argued that in
fact few contract laborers were imported, due largely to labor efforts to communicate with
prospective foreign workers to discourage them from emigrating or encourage them to
break their largely unenforceable contracts once they arrived in the United States. See
infra note 117.
74. Parsons Need Protection, supra note 69, at 9.
75. Class Legislation, supra note 72, at 4.
76. See United States v. Rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303, 305-06
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888). Apparently there were no contested factual issues, despite newspaper
accounts suggesting the Church might argue there was no contract, see supra note 59.
The case proceeded solely on the legal questions whether the hiring, conceded to have
occurred, was within the statutory prohibition and, if so, whether the statute was
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that there was no reason to suppose Congress contemplated a case of this
kind when enacting the statute. "[I]ndeed, it would not be indulging a
violent supposition to assume that no legislative body in this country
would have advisedly enacted a law framed so as to cover a case like the
present." 77 But the terms of the statute were "plain, unambiguous, and
explicit," and
the courts are not at liberty to go outside of the language to
search for a meaning which it does not reasonably bear in the
effort to ascertain and give effect to what may be imagined to
have been or not to have been the intention of congress. When-
ever the will of congress is declared in ample and unequivocal
language, that will must be absolutely followed, and it is not ad-
missible to resort to speculations of policy, nor even to the views
of members of congress in debate, to find reasons to control or
modify the statute.78
The next day's newspaper reported that the decision in the case was
unlikely to have any effect on Dr. Warren's tenure as rector of the
Church. 79 Stephen Baker, one of the vestrymen of the Church and also
the representative of John S. Kennedy, confirmed Kennedy's "disinter-
ested motives" in urging the lawsuit, "his only object having been to test
the law, and to show its absurdity in applying it to professional men."80
With Kennedy being in Europe, Baker was holding the promised check
for $1000 to be paid into the treasury of the church as indemnification
for the penalty if the case were ultimately decided against it.81 It was
Kennedy's intent, Baker said, to "have the matter carried to the highest
court in order to thoroughly test the law."8 2 District Attorney Walker
praised the decision and defended his own actions. He "had not
presented the case in a spirit of levity, but to vindicate the law. If the
decision forced an amendment of the law no one would be more pleased
than himself."8 3 He noted that the Church corporation could settle the
matter by paying the fine, though it had a right to bring the case to trial.
"They could not carry it up to the Supreme Court of the United States,
however, because the amount involved in the fine was too small."84
constitutional. The latter point was addressed in the parties' briefs but not reached by the
opinion.
77. Id. at 304.
78. Id.





84. Id. The Assistant District Attorney was, of course, incorrect in suggesting the case
could not be brought to the Supreme Court, since the construction of a federal statute was
involved, along with possible federal constitutional questions.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
The Church chose not to contest the facts, and judgment issued
from the circuit court on July 24, 1888.85 The Church immediately filed
a writ of error in the Supreme Court,8 6 which was granted on August 17,
1888.87 The Church apparently attempted to reach a settlement that
would have prevented any definitive ruling, however. 88 On April 16,
1889, the Secretary of the Treasury requested an opinion from the Attor-
ney General regarding his authority to compromise the suit against the
Church.89 Two months later, Attorney General W.H.H. Miller responded
that the Secretary had no statutory authority to settle the suit against Holy
Trinity Church, as he would if it were a "claim" rather than ajudgment in
favor of the United States.90 Briefs were finally filed in December 1891,
after an unexplained two year delay,9 1 and the argument was held on
January 7, 1892.
In an article headlined "Looks Bad for Trinity," the Times reported
that questions asked by the Court at the argument strongly suggested an
ultimate ruling upholding the penalty assessed against the Church. 92
Seaman Miller first presented his argument that construing the Alien
Contract Labor Act to bar importation of ministers would be both against
the intent of Congress and unconstitutional:
85. See Judgment at 9, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892) (No. 13,166).
86. Actions originating in the circuit courts were heard on appeal at the United States
Supreme Court. See Revised Statutes of the United States, Title 13, § 691 (1878).
87. See Writ of Error at 1, Church of the Holy Trinity (No. 13,166).
88. The existence of compromise efforts may explain why the case was not heard
during the Supreme Court's 1888 Term, as originally ordered by the Court. See Record at
11, Church of the Holy Trinity (No. 13,166). The efforts at compromise do not explain the
delay of more than two years from the failed compromise effort to the argument of the
case in January 1892, however. See Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1840-41. But the delay
may not have been unusual at the time; in April 1890, when testifying before a House of
Representatives committee investigating enforcement of the immigration laws, Edward
Mitchell, then the United States District Attorney for New York, said the case was pending
before the Supreme Court and "there it takes three or four years, I think, to reach a case."
H.R. Rep. No. 51-3472, at 392 (1890).
89. The Secretary may have been reluctant to enter any compromise: The Attorney
General's opinion responded to "[your] question whether you have to entertain the
proposition of the Church of the Holy Trinity" to compromise. 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 345, 345
(1891) (emphasis added). One would rather expect a party willing to compromise to ask
whether she "may," not "has to," entertain the proposal. Why the Secretary would ask for
the opinion if he wished to reject the compromise is not clear.
90. 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 345, 347-50 (1889) (inferring from Congress's choice of the
word "compromise" rather than "mitigate" or "remit" that the Secretary of the Treasury's
power to settle applied only to claims that had not yet resulted in judgments). Apparently
other litigants were more successful in reaching settlements, presumably before judgments
issued, because in 1891 Congress amended the Alien Contract Labor Act to prevent any
suit from being "settled, compromised, or discontinued without the consent of the court
entered of record with reasons therefor." Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 2, 26 Stat. 1084,
1084.
91. See supra note 88.
92. Looks Bad for Trinity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1892, at 5.
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Nearly every one of the justices on the bench then took a part in
the discussion. Their questions showed that although Congress
may have intended simply to exclude workingmen, yet the lan-
guage of the act itself was on its face so plain as not to leave any
room for the court to inquire into Congressional intention.
"The act prohibits importations of persons under contract
to perform labor or service of any kind," said Justice Field, and
added, "Don't we, [meaning the Justices] perform service here?"
Other questions made it evident that the court thought all ex-
cept actors, lecturers, and others specially exempted were ex-
cluded by its terms....
Mr. Miller, in answering these inquiries, contended that
such a construction would be an absurdity....
Justice Brewer: "Is it not just as much of an absurdity to
prevent the incoming of an honest laborer as of an Episcopal
minister?"9 3
The tenor of the questions so strongly indicated the Justices' agreement
with the government's case that the Assistant Attorney General decided
to forego oral argument and submit his case solely on his brief.94
Whether the Justices had hidden their true thoughts at the argu-
ment, had been deprived of the chance to display skepticism of the gov-
ernment's case by the failure of the Assistant Attorney General to present
an oral argument, or had changed their minds upon deliberating, the
predictions of outcome at the time of the argument proved wrong. On
February 29, 1892, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision
of the circuit court.95 "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers," wrote Justice Brewer for the
Court.9 6 "'The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its
letter."' 9 7 The aim of Congress, gleaned from the language of the Act's
title, contemporaneous events, and the legislative history, was to "stay the
influx of ... cheap unskilled labor."9 8 Congress did not intend to ex-
clude a minister such as Dr. Warren when it enacted the Alien Contract
Labor Act, the Court concluded.
Dr. Warren pronounced himself "surprised ... to learn that I was not
a contract laborer."9 9 The vestry had "studiously kept ... from me" the
details of the litigation "as they did not wish that I should be troubled by
93. Id. (bracketed material in original).
94. See id.
95. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
96. Id. at 459.
97. Id. at 461 (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868)).
98. Id. at 465.
99. The Right to Import Rectors, supra note 42, at 2. According to Dr. Warren's son,
Warren later said he was "always irritated" by the implication that he was not a "worker,"
since ministers work as hard as anyone. Telephone Interview with James Elliott Lindsley
(Feb. 7, 2000) (reporting conversations with Warren's son). On the other hand, he was
reportedly amused that the rector of a Church would be called a contract laborer. Letter
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it," but, he said, the Church had expected the Supreme Court would up-
hold the decision made by the lower court. 10 0
II. ACTS: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE ALIEN CONTRACT
LABOR ACT
The Court's decision that Dr. Warren was not hired in violation of
the Alien Contract Labor Act was based on its understanding of the spirit
and purpose of the Act as reflected in its legislative history. From his own
review of that legislative history, Vermeule concludes that Brewer and the
Court mishandled the analysis, that in fact the legislative history "read as
a whole, provides direct and relatively reliable evidence that undermines
the Court's interpretation and confirms the evident meaning of the statu-
tory text."10 1
Vermeule concedes that portions of the legislative history suggest the
Act was aimed at halting the importation of cheap manual laborers con-
sidered harmful to American society, 102 but he points to aspects of the
legislative history ignored by Brewer that counter this analysis. Among
them are the proviso in the original bill excepting "professional actors,
singers and lecturers" from the Act's scope, which would have been un-
necessary if the bill included only manual laborers; comments by both
supporters and opponents of the bill that acknowledged the breadth of
the bill's language, in contrast to the drafter's aims; the failure of the bill
to pass the Senate in the waning days of the first session of the 48th Con-
gress, after its sponsor explained that if there were more time an amend-
ment would be offered to clarify the intent to include only manual labor;
the passage of the bill in the next session of Congress with several amend-
ments, none of them narrowing the scope to manual labor; and two collo-
quies immediately before passage that included statements by the bill's
House and Senate floor managers seeming to acknowledge the breadth
of the bill's final language.10 3
It is true, as Vermeule demonstrates, that the legislative history is
significantly more complex than apparent from the Court's opinion and
that there is evidence in that history to support the broad literal meaning
of the Act's language. But Vermeule, too, oversimplifies. Before turning
to the evidence supporting the expansive literal reading, he acknowl-
edges briefly that the bill was "aimed to halt the importation of European
and Asian manual laborers thought to be a degraded species of immi-
grants harmful to American labor and institutions."10 4 Like a litigant's
strategic concession of a significant fact to avoid having the jury hear per-
from A.W. Robinson, granddaughter of Dr. Warren, to Carol Chomsky (Feb. 28, 2000) (on
file with author).
100. The Right to Import Rectors, supra note 42, at 2.
101. Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1845.
102. See id. at 1846.
103. See id. at 1845-50.
104. Id. at 1846.
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suasive and moving testimony, that acknowledgment misses the flavor of
much of the debate supporting a narrower interpretation of the Act.
Vermeule glosses over much of the early consideration of the bill, the
many and repeated statements about the aims of the legislation, and the
context for the acknowledgments of the breadth of the language ulti-
mately enacted. I review those discussions at some length to try to convey
a more complete sense of the legislative purposes.
The aim of the bill, as described in the House Report accompanying
it, was to:
restrict and prohibit the immigration or rather the importation
of... the immigrant who does not come by "his own initiative,
but by that of the capitalist." It seeks to restrain and prohibit
the immigration or importion [sic] of laborers who would have
never seen our shores but for the inducements and allurements
of men whose only object is to obtain labor at the lowest possible
rate, regardless of the social and material well-being of our own
citizens and regardless of the -evil consequences which result to
American laborers from such immigration. 10 5
In contrast to immigrants who come to the United States voluntarily, for
their own betterment, with a commitment to their new country and an
intention to become American citizens, these paid laborers are described
as ignorant about the United States and as being kept isolated from other
Americans and sent back by their "sponsors" when their contracts are at
an end.10 6 The report goes on to discuss the economic rationale for the
provision:
The demand for the enactment of some restrictive measure of
this character comes not alone from American workingmen, but
also from employers of labor in America. The employers of la-
bor who, from inability or from patriotic motives, employ only
American workingmen, are unable to compete in the markets
with the corporations who employ the cheap imported labor. 10 7
The problem, as the report describes it, is the "great numbers of immi-
grants ... who are owned by capitalists,"'0 8 the "large gangs of laborers" who
arrive, all bound for the same place.109 The report quotes Mr. John Swin-
ton of New York City writing about "firms engaged in trafficking in
human flesh," with 14,000 Italians being brought to this country under
contract and 6,000 of them returning home.' 1 0 There is much talk, too,
of the terrible conditions under which many of these contract laborers
live and work. 1 ' The report makes specific reference to the glass manu-
facturing industry, silk manufacturing establishments, an iron company,
105. S. Rep. No. 48-820, at 2 (1884) (reprinting H.R. Rep. No. 48-444 (1884)).
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2-3 (quoting Count Esterhazy, Austrian consul to the United States).
109. Id. at 3 (quoting Superintendent Jackson of Castle Garden).
110. Id. at 3.
111. See id. at 3-4, 7-12.
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railroads, and coke manufacturing plants as sources of complaints about
these kinds of problems. 112
The effort in Congress to limit the importation of cheap labor had,
in fact, begun as early as 1869, with the introduction of a bill regulating
the importation of immigrants under labor contracts.11 3 As with the law
enacted in 1885, congressional action was motivated in part by pressure
from American workers and the American labor movement, which from
the end of the Civil War had as one of its major goals the prohibition of
the importation of contract laborers. 114
According to a congressional commission reporting on immigration
in 1911, during the years following the introduction of the 1870 bill Con-
gress showed "a general sentiment against the importation of contract
labor, although in favor of the immigration of worthy foreigners."1 15 The
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first major exclusionary immigration
legislation, was at least in part a response to the contract labor issue.
Although American workers initially opposed the often racist calls to ex-
clude Chinese "coolies" from America's shores, they ultimately supported
the Chinese Exclusion Act's ban on the entry of Chinese laborers to the
United States because in 1882 it appeared that no other action on the
contract labor problem was politically feasible.1 16
The contract labor bill introduced in the 48th Congress was thus
part of an already lengthy history of concern with the importation of la-
borers, skilled and unskilled, by employers and its tendency to under-
mine American labor conditions.117 It was, likewise, part of an equally
lengthy history of racism and discrimination in the nation's immigration
laws. '1 8 These themes continued when the debate moved to the House
112. See id. at 2-4.
113. See Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion
Act 37 (1998). That same year, one of the first bills offered to regulate the entry of
Chinese into the United States was similarly designed to restrict the importation of Chinese
workers under labor contracts that placed the laborers in virtual slavery, rather than to bar
all Chinese immigration, though the legislative strategy later changed. See id.
114. See id. at 12, 39-59, 256; Michael C. LeMay, From Open Door to Dutch Door:
An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1820, at 55 (1987).
115. Immigration Legislation, Report of the Immigration Commission, S. Doc. No.
61-758, at 22 (1911). The Commission was created in the Immigration Act of 1907 and
charged with making a "full inquiry, examination, and investigation ... into the subject of
immigration." Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 39, 34 Stat. 898, 909.
116. See Gyory, supra note 113, at 256-57.
117. Some commentators argued that in fact there was no real problem of contract
labor displacing American workers. See, e.g., Isaac A. Hourwich, Immigration and Labor:
The Economic Aspects of European Immigration to the United States 3, 99-102 (1912)
(arguing that immigration into the United States tracks demand for labor); Charlotte
Erickson, American Industry and the European Immigrant 1860-1885, at 46-63 (1957)
(demonstrating that labor organized quite effectively to prevent employers from gaining
much advantage from contract labor). That many congressional representatives as well as
American workers believed it was a problem is undisputed, however.
118. Senate Report 820, for example, complains that "immigration from England,
Ireland, Germany, and other European countries from which the better class of
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floor. The chair of the Committee on Labor and introducer of the legis-
lation, Mr. Martin Foran, expressed the purpose of the bill as prohibiting
"men whose love of self is above their love of country and humanity from
importing into this country large bodies of foreign laborers to take the
places of and crowd out American laborers. It also prohibits the importa-
tion of skilled workmen to take the places of American skilled arti-
sans." 119 The discussion on the House floor centered on problems
caused by large scale importation of labor, often from Hungary, Italy, and
other southern European countries, for the glass blowing, mining, and
railroad industries.1 20 Much concern was expressed regarding how these
immigrants would fit into American society (or even whether they wanted
to) and about the effect of this kind of competition on domestic labor
and wages.1 21 In the midst of the House debate, Mr. Foran submitted a
report from the Committee on Labor, which summarized the problem
and the "necessity of Congressional action:"122
The foreigner who voluntarily and from choice leaves his native
land and settles in this country with the intention of becoming
immigrants come, is steadily decreasing, while immigration from southern Europe [with
special mention of Italians and Hungarians] is steadily increasing." S. Rep. No. 48-820, at 6
(1884). Racial stereotyping was displayed in the descriptions of southern European
immigrants employed by the bill's supporters, just as it was employed in the rhetoric
surrounding passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act. See Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of
Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910, 25
L. & Soc. Inquiry 1, 11-12 (2000).
According to several immigration historians, the Alien Contract Labor Act was part of
a wave of anti-immigrant nativist legislation passed in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, but having much earlier roots in American history. While new immigrants were
often needed to meet the labor needs of American employers, they were viewed as a threat
not only to jobs for native-born Americans, but to the nation's culture and institutions,
especially the economic and political systems. See Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in New
Bottles: The Deep Roots of Modern Nativism, in Immigrants Out!: The New Nativism and
the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States 13, 14-21 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
Indeed, Matthew Frye Jacobson suggests that two contending forces have shaped both
immigration policy and racial line-drawing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries:
"capitalism (with its insatiable appetite for cheap labor) and republicanism (with its
imperative of responsible citizenship)." Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different
Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race 13 (1998). Similarly, Kitty Calavita
has explored the contradictions between political demands to control the border and the
economic benefits of a cheap immigrant workforce. See Calavita, supra, at 33. Questions
about immigrants' fitness for self-government as well as racial stereotypes were part of the
debate surrounding the passage of the Alien Contract Labor Act, just as they were
throughout immigration debates and decisions of the late 1800s and early 1900s. See
Jacobson, supra, at 76-77.
119. 15 Cong. Rec. 5349 (1884). Despite the extensive discussion of the problems of
mass importation of cheap unskilled labor throughout the legislative history, it likely was
the importation of skilled artisans under contract that first motivated the labor movement
to oppose contract labor and led Mr. Foran to introduce the bill. See infra note 185 and
accompanying text.
120. See 15 Cong. Rec. 5349-71 (1884).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 5358.
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an American citizen, a part of the American body-politic, has
always been welcome to our shores....
Such an immigrant comes here because the institutions of
the country are in consonance with his social and political ideas,
and because of the advantages and opportunities afforded by
the extent of our domain and its material resources. He comes
to better his social and financial condition, to take advantage of
the facilities which he finds here; and as he comes of his own
volition, by his own means, and from choice, he always exacts for
his labor the highest rates which the market affords. No one is
injured by his coming, and he generally makes a good citizen,
the State is benefited by the acquisition. These immigrants are
generally of a higher class, socially, morally, and intellectually,
and have aided largely in the development of our industries and
the material progress of our people. With this class of immi-
grants this bill has no concern. Its object is to restrict and pro-
hibit the immigration or rather the importation of an entirely
different class of persons, the immigrant who does not come by
"his own initiative, but by that of the capitalist." It seeks to re-
strain and prohibit the immigration or importation of laborers
who would have never seen our shores but for the inducements
and allurements of men whose only object is to obtain labor at
the lowest possible rate, regardless of the social and material
well-being of our own citizens and regardless of the evil conse-
quences which result to American laborers from such
immigration.
This class of immigrants care nothing about our institu-
tions, and in many instances never even heard of them; they are
men whose passage is paid by the importers; they come here
under contract to labor for a certain number of years; they are
ignorant of our social conditions, and that they may remain so
they are isolated and prevented from coming into contact with
Americans. They are generally from the lowest social stratum,
and live upon the coarsest food and in hovels of a character
before unknown to American workmen. Being bound by con-
tract they are unable, even were they so disposed, to take advan-
tage of the facilities afforded by the country to which they have
been imported. They, as a rule, do not become citizens, and are
certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body-politic. When
their term of contract servitude expires their place is supplied by
fresh importations. The inevitable tendency of their presence
among us is to degrade American labor and reduce it to the
level of the imported pauper labor.123
When Representative Adams questioned the breadth of the bill, ask-
ing whether "Arnold, Constable & Co., or Lord & Taylor, or any of the
large retail dealers in the city of New York" would be prohibited from
hiring from abroad "an efficient clerk they would like to transfer to this
country," Mr. O'Neill, a member of the sponsoring Labor Committee,
123. Id. at 5358-59.
[Vol. 100:901
2000] UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIES OF HOLY TRINITY
replied that if such businesses "go to Europe and import this labor for the
purpose of breaking down men in their own employ" he hoped the bill
would reach them. 124 When pressed further about the precise language
of the bill, Mr. O'Neill responded:
Never mind about these hair-splitting technicalities with refer-
ence to the bill; but remedy any defects that you believe to exist
in it. If we all had to run as constitutional lawyers, few of us
would get elected [laughter], and remember that what the work-
ingmen ask you to do for them is simply that this Congress shall
give, so far as it can, protection to them against this infamous
contract system.125
It is difficult to read page after page of this House debate without
concluding that the bill was meant to address the "contract labor system,"
the practice by industrialists of importing large numbers of workers from
abroad to take the place of American laborers at reduced wages, and that
this was understood by all the legislators considering the bill. The inter-
pretational difficulty, of course, is that the language of the bill was far
broader than the articulated rationale. The language of the bill as intro-
duced-and ultimately as passed by both House and Senate-did not out-
law only mass importation of laborers. It prohibited assisting immigra-
tion by "any foreigner or foreigners" "under contract or agreement" "to
perform labor or service of any kind." Representative Kelley called the
bill "crude"126 and a bill with "grave imperfections," 12 7 and said the ex-
ceptions made to the prohibitory clauses were not
as broad as they ought to be. I do not see that it would not
preclude under grave penalties the employment on the other
side of the ocean of a nurse to care for a sick countryman re-
turning to his home, or for an infant citizen of our country who,
deprived of a mother by death or by the emergencies of a sea
voyage, needed care while crossing the ocean. 128
Nevertheless, Kelley supported the "spirit of the bill" because it addressed
the need to protect the American "laboring classes" from "importation of
cheap labor in the persons of the worst classes of the least enlightened
states of Europe."129
Some of the problems caused by the expansive language were ad-
dressed by floor amendments. When one House member pointed out
that the bill as worded would prohibit anyone from entering a contract
with an alien once that alien had arrived in the United States, the bill was
changed to avoid that problem. °30 Exceptions were added so that indi-
viduals could help members of their own families to emigrate, and so that
124. Id. at 5358.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 5355.
127. Id. at 5354.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 5353, 5370.
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skilled workmen in foreign countries could be hired in new industries
where domestic skilled labor could not be found, and the committee-
endorsed amendment excepting "professional actors, lecturers, or sing-
ers" was added. 131 An amendment to restrict the scope of the prohibition
to importation of workers "at a rate of wages less than the current rate of
wages for the same class of labor in the locality in the United States where
such labor is to be performed," consistent with the claimed purpose of
avoiding the degradation of American labor, was defeated, without
discussion.1 32
When the bill left the House floor, then, it retained the extremely
broad language of the prohibition, despite the frequently repeated de-
scriptions of a much narrower purpose. There were references to the
difficulty posed by the bill's reference to "labor or service of any kind,"
but little direct attention to that difficulty, and no explanation for the
failure to attempt to narrow the scope of the operative language.
In the Senate, the bill as it passed the House was presented by Mr.
Blair, who described the purpose of the bill in language similar to that
used in the House discussions (though, it appears, to a small group of
Senators) :133
Its object is to remove a great and rapidly growing public evil, an
evil striking at the interests of millions of our countrymen, and
those of our countrymen who can least bear the existence, much
less any increase, of the evil of which they complain.
*.. [T] he practice has grown up on the part of many of the
employers of the country of sending their agents abroad to Eng-
land, France, Italy, Hungary, Germany, Austria, and in fact to all
European countries with hardly an exception, for the purpose
of contracting with bodies of working people, paying their ex-
penses of transportation to this country, in order that their
cheap labor may be brought in competition with that of our own
citizens.1 34
The Report from the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, upon
which Brewer relied in his opinion, recommended passage of the bill
without amendments in order to secure passage during the final days of
the session, "although there are certain features thereof which might well
be changed or modified."1 35 In particular, the Committee indicated it
would have recommended substituting "manual labor" and "manual ser-
vice" for "labor and service" as "sufficiently broad to accomplish the pur-
poses of the bill . . . [and to] remove objections which a sharp and per-
131. Id. at 5371.
132. Id.
133. Senator Blair asked for agreement to have the bill considered immediately at this
first reading. "The question being put," the nays appeared to prevail. Id. at 6058. When
Mr. Blair asked for a division, the vote was 4 yeas and 8 nays, though when the roll was then
called there were 26 yeas, 14 nays, and 36 absent. See id.
134. Id. at 6057.
135. Id. at 6059.
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haps unfriendly criticism may urge to the proposed legislation. " 13 6 But
hoping to achieve final passage quickly, the Committee did not recom-
mend amendment, noting its belief "that the bill in its present form will
be construed as including only those whose labor or service is manual in
character."1 37 Mr. Blair nonetheless indicated that he intended to move
the modifications referenced in the Committee report:
so that the provision of the bill would then be restricted to the
evil that exists, and it would be available for the protection of
that class of our people who are suffering most from the evil.
With that modification, which I am assured by the friends of the
bill will be at once assented to in the House so that the bill will
reach its passage at this session, there can be, as I think, no ob-
jection on the part of any one in either branch of Congress. It
would apply only to those engaged in manual labor or
service. 1 38
The entire House Report was then read into the record, but rather than
take up the measure, the Senate proceeded to set aside the regular order
of business to handle other matters needing attention. 13 9 Senator Blair
attempted several times to return to consideration of the contract labor
bill, but each time consent was given to attend to other business. Finally,
Senator Brown moved that further consideration of the bill be postponed
to the second Thursday of December, when Congress would be back in
session, the bill being "a very important measure, and as it is very difficult
to keep a quorum, and as we can not discuss a great question of this
character at the close of the session as we would have to do and as we
ought to do if we mean to consider it properly."140 The motion passed
on a voice vote. 14 1
After several false starts, 14 2 the bill was finally taken up by the Senate




139. There appears to have been some procedural maneuvering, though the record
contains no explanation of those efforts. After having the Clerk read the House Report
into the record, Senator Blair sought unanimous consent to dispense with the reading of
the appendices to the report. Senator Hawley objected, however, saying "I have not heard
enough of it yet." He then immediately offered to withdraw his objection if the Senate
would proceed "to the consideration of executive business." Id. at 6061.
140. Id. at 6065.
141. See id. at 6067. The chair declared "that the ayes appeared to prevail." Senator
Blair then called for the yeas and nays, but to calls of "No! No!" he withdrew the call "on
the suggestion that it may disable us from doing business." The President pro tempore
then declared the motion agreed to. Id.
142. Senator Blair attempted to get the bill heard on February 4, 1885, see 16 Cong.
Rec. 1259-60 (1885), complaining that consideration of the interstate commerce bill and
various other matters had impeded consideration of the alien contract labor bill. He
referred to the "very great public interest" in the bill, with several state legislatures passing
resolutions calling for Senate action on it. Id. at 1255. When he tried again late in the
day, Senator Plumb said he did not believe the bill "will be able to get through as readily as
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served by the bill:- "to prevent substantially the cooly practices which have
been initiated and carried on to a considerable extent between America
and Europe."143 There was much debate about the necessity and wisdom
of making ship captains liable for importing contract labor and about the
wisdom of the clause excepting importation of labor for new businesses
where skilled labor cannot be obtained in the United States.' 44 More
significantly for understanding the scope of the prohibition, several sena-
tors warned that the bill as drafted would not accomplish its stated pur-
poses. Senator Hawley concurred in the effort to prevent
contracts that bring a body of poor laborers over here, paying
their transportation under an agreement that they shall work
not alone till they have paid their fare, but shall work for
months and years for wage below those of the ordinary Ameri-
can laborer-those contracts are shameful, they are criminal,
they are wrong, they are against natural right, against American
law and the spirit of our institutions. They ought not to be
permitted.145
But he feared that the bill as drafted would interfere as well with "honest
immigration." 146 In response, Senator Blair reiterated that the bill was
designed to assist "the American toiler, the American workman, the
American laborer... the man who is nearest the earth."1 47 Senator Mor-
gan criticized the bill as class legislation, prohibiting contracts with re-
spect to certain kinds of labor but not as to others:
The classes legislated for and protected by the bill are not the
agriculturists, they are not the house-builders and the ordinary
mechanics of the country. They are almost wholly and exclu-
sively the miners, the men who delve about the iron-works, and
the men who do the ruder sorts of work about the manufactur-
ing establishments of this land.... [I] t discriminates in favor of
professional actors, lecturers, or singers. It makes an express ex-
ception and provision for professional actors, lecturers, and
singers, leaving out all the other classes of professional men....
Personal or domestic servants are excepted; that is to say, a gen-
[Senator Blair] thinks, although I am not aware of any opposition to it on my part. I am in
favor of it with some amendments; but it is very late now, and we shall get into some
wrangle about it if it is taken up." Id. at 1260.
143. Id. at 1624. Blair continued:
(I]t does undertake to prohibit the efforts of corporations and of individuals, of
capitalists, which have been put forth to some extent in this country to introduce
into it the cheap and servile labor of foreign lands, and, when it is not necessary
to do so for the good of the American people and the promotion of American
industries, the skilled labor of other countries, because that labor, as we know,
can be commanded at very greatly reduced wages as compared with what we pay
to the working people of our own country.
Id.
144. See id. at 1625-30.
145. Id. at 1625.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1626.
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tleman who has got the money can come here and bring his
personal or domestic servants with him from abroad; but if he
happens to be a lawyer, an artist, a painter, an engraver, a sculp-
tor, a great author, or what not, and he comes under employ-
ment to write for a newspaper, or to write books, or to paint
pictures, as we are informed that a recent Secretary of State sent
abroad for an artist to paint his picture, he comes under the
general provisions of the bill.' 48
Senator Morgan's examples of immigrants excluded by the bill in-
clude "brain toilers" not dissimilar to Dr. Warren, to whom the Act would
later be applied. Senator Blair responded to these concerns, as he had in
the previous session, that "[i]f that class of people are liable to become
the subject-matter of such importation, then the bill applies to them."149
Senator Sherman expanded on this point:
I supposed that the bill was in the line of the other legislation
[the Chinese Exclusion Act], to discriminate against a class, I do
not care of what race or of what color, but a class of people who
do not own themselves, who are brought here by corporations
or by wealthy persons to compete in mines, manufactures, and
establishments of various kinds with the free labor of free men,
against hardy miners, mechanics, manufacturers, and even farm-
ers .... [The first section of the bill, together with the excep-
tions in the fifth section,] describes the importation of men who
come here under special contracts, mostly in large numbers, to
work at largely reduced pay for the benefit of corporations and
companies. If the definition is not correctly given, if the kind of
people aimed at by the bill is not correctly defined, then as a
matter of course the Senator from Delaware and the Senator
from Alabama can suggest the correction. What I intend to vote
for when I vote for the bill is to prevent this organized corporate
importation, not of laboring men, but of bought men, to come
here and compete with our laboring men, with our mechanics
and miners. 150
The critical distinction, it appears, is not between manual laborers
and "brain toilers," despite the language of the Senate Report, but be-
tween those who are "bought" and "owned" by corporations importing
"mostly" large numbers of workers to supplant domestic employees and
those who come voluntarily and individually. Still, the language of the
bill was too broad for that purpose, and Senator McPherson reiterated
that point:
Mr. McPHERSON. The Senator says, if I understand him
aright, that the bill is directed against the importation into this
country of people who are practically bought to come here as
organized labor.
148. Id. at 1632-33.
149. Id. at 1633. Possibly in recognition of the difficulties being discussed, Blair went
on to say that "[perhaps the bill ought to be further amended." Id.
150. Id. at 1634-35.
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Mr. SHERMAN. That is what I understand it to be.
Mr. McPHERSON. The phraseology of the bill is very lib-
eral, it seems to me, and applies even to individual cases; it
makes no difference for what reason they come. It does not ap-
ply to organized labor alone, but reaches a great many laborers
who would naturally come here to better themselves, and who
come here under a contract previously made for that purpose.
Mr. SHERMAN. I will tell you what kind of a case it inter-
feres with. Take a railroad corporation in the State of New
Jersey that is not willing to pay a dollar and a quarter a day for
wages, and finds that on account of the great superabundance
of labor in Italy and Hungary it can hire men by the thousand,
through shysters that it sends there for the purpose of talking to
them, at 50 or 60 cents a day upon an agreement to work three
years, with a certain stipulated quantity of rice and other food of
that kind, and they make such contracts and are brought over,
men who can not speak our language, who are not acquainted
with our institutions, and they are put to work on a railroad in
NewJersey, thus driving out of employment 3,000 Americanized
laborers, good honest Americans, native-born or ordinarily natu-
ralized citizens. That is the kind of people I want to get at. If
the Senator and I can only agree on the language of the bill, I
have no doubt we shall vote together.
Mr. McPHERSON. I quite agree with the Senator from
Ohio, and probably will go as far as he will in any attempt to
protect American labor, and I deplore as much as that Senator
can the organizations that are gotten up for the purpose of de-
priving American labor of employment; but I want to do it by
some measure of legislation that will be just and fair and proper,
that will reach exactly that class of cases, and at the same time
will not be so sweeping in its provisions as to deter honest and
proper laborers from coming to this country seeking to better
their condition.
The Senator from Ohio will go no further than I will in the
direction that this bill proposes, and I submit that the only thing
I wish to do is to perfect it. I do not like the bill as it is; I do not
think the bill should pass in its present shape: but I do think it
is possible to so amend it as to make it effective and capable of
doing a great deal of good, and to that end I pledge myself, for I
am very ready to aid in legislation on this question. 15 1
At which point-the Senate adjourned for the day. 15 2 When discussion
resumed, four days later, there were more long speeches about the evils
of importing large numbers of laborers to depress the domestic labor
market. 15 3 And there were more references to the drafting problems.
Senator Vest said he thought the bill was "immature and crude, but I shall
151. Id. at 1635-36.
152. See id. at 1636.
153. See id. at 1778-86.
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vote for it on account of the salient principle which it announces, hoping
that time and experience may perfect this legislation hereafter."154 Sena-
tor Platt noted that:
This bill has been here since lastJune. It has been for one rea-
son or another, largely because of our rules, debarred from a
hearing until this time; and now in the closing hours of the ses-
sion [the session concluded on March 3, 1884, just two weeks
later] I am pained to observe that Senators whom I believe to be
in favor of the principle of this bill seem to overlook that princi-
ple and to be directing their attention to what appear to be
some crudities and informalities which appear in the bill. I
agree that this bill is crude, that it has not been drawn with
proper care. I think it illustrates the folly of a class of men who
suppose that bills can be better prepared for the consideration
of Congress and passage by Congress by those who are not famil-
iar with legal phraseology and with the legal profession.
But if I were to criticise this bill I would criticise it because I
think it is not properly drawn to effectuate the object and pur-
pose which those who desire the passage of the bill, and which I
desire, have in mind. I do not believe that these sections which
have been criticised, that the phraseology which has been
criticised is likely to work any considerable hardship or injustice.
I think the bill, if it fails in effecting a wise and salutary object,
will fail because it is not properly drawn to effectuate the pur-
poses of those who believe in the principle of the bill. 155
And the purpose Senator Platt articulated was the same as had been ex-
pressed in speech after speech-to protect domestic "laborers, men who
earn their bread by the sweat of their brow" and prevent "importing la-
borers as we import horses and cattle."1 5 6
Several times more, Senators rose to object to the breadth of the bill
and to offer limiting amendments. Senator Lapham agreed that the
object of this bill, as its title imports, is to prevent the evil of
importing laborers here in groups, in colonies, in shiploads. It
is to prevent the practice of bringing classes of laborers here
under contract to perform service, and I am in full sympathy
with that; and if this bill reached no further than that, I should
be in favor of it without changing a letter .... 157
His worry, however, was not about "brain toilers," but about individuals
who labored to send money to help their friends emigrate, exacting or
accepting from them an agreement to repay the funds advanced, and
thus possibly violating the prohibition against prepaying the passage of
someone "under contract or agreement... to perform labor or service of
any kind in the United States." 158 Although assured that such individuals
154. Id. at 1780.
155. Id. at 1781.
156. Id. at 1781-82.
157. Id. at 1786.
158. Id.
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would not be covered by the prohibition, the Senate agreed to an amend-
ment to except "personal friends" from those covered. 15 9 Senator Sauls-
bury spoke of the "sweeping... character" of the bill and unsuccessfully
offered an amendment to exempt agricultural workers from the prohibi-
tions because of the scarcity of such workers. 160 Senator Morgan worried
about the effect on state government efforts to encourage immigration,
but his attempt to address this issue was rejected, perhaps based on Sena-
tor George's argument that general efforts to promote immigration were
not outlawed by the bill's provisions. 161 In the midst of all this, Senator
Morgan offered more testimony about the looseness of the language of
the bill:
The honorable Senator who occupies the chair now [Mr. Platt],
if I remember, when he took the floor this afternoon for the
purpose of advocating this bill led off by saying that the bill was
such a one as a body of lawyers would not have prepared, and
the bill ought to have undergone the scrutiny, if I understood
him aright, of the Judiciary Committee, or some committee of
this body that could put it in shape.
I but participate in the common sentiment when I declare
in my place in the Senate that I can not understand this bill as
the Senator from Mississippi understands it. His vision about it
is so much clearer than mine that I regret that I can not partici-
pate in the very lucid manner in which he understands this bill
to his own satisfaction. To me it is cloudy and murky and
muddy; to me it is ill-shaped, and it does not express any correct
or clear idea.
1.. [I] t strikes me that the honorable Senator in his zeal for
this particular bill has lost sight of the real construction of its
language. Why shall the Senate of the United States send out a
lumbering affair like this into the world for the criticism of the
bar of the United States? Sir, they would laugh at you when you
have done it.1 6 2
The Senate once more adjourned, without considering any amend-
ments to correct the identified deficiencies, 163 but with the promise that
the bill would be called up the next day for final action. 1 64 When discus-
sion resumed, Senator McPherson again reiterated the aims of the bill:
The bill is intended to prevent the importation of foreign
labor by contract, which means cheap labor, pauper labor, and I
might add vicious labor, which when brought to this country en-
159. Id. at 1786-87.
160. Id. at 1790-91.
161. See id. at 1792-94.
162. Id. at 1795.
163. The only amendment considered was one offered by Senator Morgan to exempt
state agents who induce immigration and any other persons who "in good faith" assist
individuals or families to emigrate for the purpose of permanent settlement. Id. at 1791.
164. See id. at 1797.
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ters into competition with our laborers here; and our own la-
borer in the course of time from the result of that competition
becomes a tramp, seeking bread from door to door.
There are only two classes in this country who indulge in
this kind of practice, the railroad corporations and the manufac-
turing corporations. 165
Several relatively insignificant amendments were then offered and
adopted, with virtually no discussion.1 66 Perhaps in response to the com-
plaints about the "crudities" of the bill, but more likely because he op-
posed the substance, Senator Hawley moved to refer the bill to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary "with instructions to report not later than the
20th instant a bill effectuating the purposes provided for in the bill as
amended." 167 The motion was defeated, after which the bill was finally
brought to a vote, passing by a vote of fifty to nine.168 The House con-
curred in the Senate version.
The subsequent history of the Alien Contract Labor Act offers addi-
tional information about congressional intent with respect to the emigra-
tion of Dr. Warren. In January 1889, while the Holy Trinity Church litiga-
tion was still pending at the Supreme Court, a bill was considered in the
House that would add to the Act's exemptions "professors in universities
or ministers of the gospel."' 69 A committee-written substitute was
presented on the House floor on August 30, 1890, still containing a new
exception for "ministers of the gospel."' 70 Representative Buchanan,
who was in charge of the bill, referred specifically to the Holy Trinity
Church case in explaining the change:
Under the provisions of [the Act] a minister of the gospel, com-
ing to New York, under engagement to serve a church in that
city, was held to come within the prohibition; and the proposed
165. Id. at 1833.
166. Two of the amendments changed the primary enforcement section to allow the
United States as well as any individual to sue for recovery of the $1000 fine imposed on
persons or companies importing labor in violation of the statute, but provided that the fine
would be paid solely to the United States Treasury rather than being shared with the
person bringing suit. See id. at 1838. Other amendments added artists to the list of
workers exempt from the prohibition on importation, see id. at 1837, and changed
"service or labor" in section 2 to "labor or service," id. at 1839 ("That would be altogether
more poetic, while the other phrase savors rather of blank verse."). The Senators rejected
amendments to remove "singers" from the list of exempt workers (moved by a Senator who
complained about the treatment of Italian child street singers) and to add "artisans" to that
list. Id. at 1837.
167. Id. at 1839.
168. See id. at 1839-40.
169. The change was part of a bill focused primarily on strengthening the
enforcement of the Alien Contract Labor Act in the face of complaints that the collectors
of customs were generally unable to detect violations. The Ford Committee recommended
transferring enforcement authority to the federal government in response to these
difficulties. See H.R. Rep. No. 50-3792, at 4 (1889) (accompanying H.R. 12,291, 50th
Cong. (1889)).
170. 21 Cong. Rec. 9438 (1890).
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amendment to the original law adds to this exemption regularly
ordained ministers of the gospel and learned professors of col-
leges or seminaries. 171
No objections were made to exempting ministers in Dr. Warren's
circumstances, though the floor debate does not indicate an intent to
change the result in the Holy Trinity Church case itself.172 Interestingly,
however, in view of Brewer's subsequent declaration that "this is a Chris-
tian nation,"173 a lengthy colloquy occurred on the Senate floor about
the proper scope of the exemption for ministers. Senator Carlisle moved
to amend the bill by changing "regularly ordained ministers of the gos-
pel" to "regularly ordained or constituted ministers of religion." 174 At
least some of his colleagues failed to understand the need for the sug-
gested change:
Mr. CARLISLE ... The bill as it now stands reads "regu-
larly ordained ministers of the gospel," and if passed in that
shape would confine it alone to ministers of the christian reli-
gion and exclude Jewish rabbis and others.
Mr. COCKRELL. Why?
Mr. CARLISLE. Because they do not come in as ministers
of the gospel.
Mr. PLATT. I do not think the Senator quite explains to
the Senate (at least I do not quite catch it; there has been a
good deal of confusion here) the difference between a minister
of the gospel and a minister of religion. I wish he would do so.
Mr. CARLISLE. As I understand it, this provision would en-
tirely exclude Jewish rabbis, because they are not ministers of
the gospel, but they are ministers of religion. Of course there is
a little difficulty in selecting the exact language which would in-
clude just what we want to include, but it occurred to me that
that was the very best phrase we could use. The bill as it stands
now would exclude ministers of every religion whatever except
the christian religion. It is confined alone to ministers of the
171. Id. at 9439.
172. Vermeule notes the passage of an exemption for ministers in 1891, though with
slightly different language than as first introduced, but dismisses the significance of the
enactment because it was accompanied by an explicit nonretroactivity provision leaving the
Holy Trinity Church litigation unaffected by the change. See Vermeule, supra note 20, at
1841-42. That statement is true as far as it goes, but it suggests, inaccurately I think, that
Congress was affirmatively aiming to leave the Holy Trinity Church ruling intact. In fact,
there was no mention of the Holy Trinity Church case in conjunction with the
nonretroactivity clause, and the inclusion of such a clause may have been simply to avoid
disrupting the already criticized efforts at enforcing the statute. An identical provision was
included in the next set of amendments. See Law of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 28, 32 Stat.
1213, 1220.
173. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
174. 21 Cong. Rec. 10,466 (1890).
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gospel, thus making a distinction between different religious be-
liefs, which I do not think we ought to make. 175
It was evident from the discussion that the members of the House recog-
nized that America was not just a Christian nation, though they were un-
certain just how ecumenical they wanted to be:
Mr. COCKRELL. I should like to ask the Senator from Ken-
tucky whether this amendment would exclude the ministers of
the Chinese religion, those who conduct joss services, or the
Mormons, or the ministers of anything else called religion. It
seems to me that the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky
is entirely too broad; that a Chinese minister conducting the
services in their temple, worshiping at the shrine of their joss,
could come in under this provision, and also a Brahman, or a
Mormon-and a great many Mormons are coming in now-and
Mussulmans, or anything of the kind. I think the amendment is
entirely too broad.
Mr. BLAIR. I expect that would be the effect of the amend-
ment; but this is a free country, free in religion as in everything
else.
Mr. CARLISLE. I suppose we do not propose to make a
discrimination among the various religious beliefs. This simply
permits them to come here. If they should be guilty of any ac-
tion in violation of our law after they come, of course they would
be punished as others. The Chinese are excluded now by law,
not because they are ministers of religion, but simply because of
their nativity and race.
Mr. PLATT. If I may be permitted, having asked one ques-
tion, to say another word, I do not think any one would desire to
exclude Jewish rabbis, but there may be some persons who
would come in under what might be called religion that it would
be quite well for this country not to have included.
Mr. BLAIR. This bill does not undertake to exclude or to
interfere with religion or religious belief at all. It is designed to
prevent the introduction of alien contract labor. It seems to me
that the amendment which the Senator from Kentucky suggests
can hardly be objected to. 1 7 6
The amendment was added to the bill with no further discussion,'
77
although the bill was temporarily withdrawn by its sponsor, Senator Blair,
who complained of various other amendments creating a bill "which is
inferior in its efficiency and usefulness." 178 The bill was reintroduced in
the next session, again with an exemption for "regularly ordained minis-
ters of the Gospel,"1 79 which was again changed, without discussion, to
175. Id. at 10,466-67.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 10,467.
178. Id. at 10,559.
179. S. Rep. No. 51-2165, at 4 (1891); H. Rep. No. 51-3808, at 2 (1891).
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the more general "ministers of any religious denomination."180 The bill
in that form passed both the Senate and the House. 18 1 Although the
exemption for ministers was enacted almost a full year before the Holy
Trinity Church case was argued at the Supreme Court, it appears that the
amendment was not brought to the attention of the Justices when they
deliberated, 182 nor was it mentioned in the Court's opinion. The amend-
ment was prospective in its effect on pending prosecutions 183 and there-
fore could not be applied directly to the hiring of Dr. Warren. Still, it is
curious that an enactment bearing so precisely on the issue of congres-
sional purpose was completely ignored by both court and litigants.
So just what was the intent of the Senate and the House when they
enacted the Alien Contract Labor Act? Or, to ask a more relevant ques-
tion, was it the intent of Congress to cast the net broadly, to exclude from
American shores any person who arrived with a prearranged contract for
labor or service of any kind? Determining the intent of a body such as
Congress is problematic, of course. 18 4 But the message of an overwhelm-
ing number of comments from committee reports, sponsors, and floor
supporters was that the aim of the bill-and therefore, one may infer, the
aim of those who voted for it-was to stop the wholesale importation of
cheap labor to undermine American workers.' 8 5
180. 22 Cong. Rec. 2955 (1891).
181. See id. at 3245, 3428.
182. Indeed, the attorney for the Government told the Supreme Court it was
remarkable that Congress did not make the meaning of the law clearer" when it amended
the law in 1888 "if the decision of Judge Wallace in this case... did such violence to the
intention of Congress." Brief for the United States at 7-8, Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (No. 13,166).
183. The amending statute adopted in 1891 contained a clause specifying that
pending cases should not be affected by any of the amendments. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891,
ch. 551, § 12, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086 ("[N]othing contained in this act shall be construed to
affect any prosecution or other proceeding, criminal or civil, begun under any existing act
or any acts hereby amended, but such prosecution or other proceedings, criminal or civil,
shall proceed as if this act had not been passed."). The amendment was partially
retroactive as well, since it made lawful any importations that occurred before passage of
the amendment, as long as the government had not yet chosen to prosecute. This raises
additional equitable concerns which, of course, the Court did not address.
184. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 642-44
(1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism].
185. At least one historian-and the one who explored the history of the contract
labor law in the most detail-argues convincingly that the original impetus behind the
legislation (and labor's support for it) was to protect skilled (not unskilled) workers.
Originally promoted by the glassworkers' union, the issue gathered support from other
skilled craft unions and only later received support from the Knights of Labor, the
organizing body for unskilled workers. Martin Foran, who introduced the bill and was its
chief sponsor, was past president of the Coopers International Union and most closely
associated with the craft unions. In Congress, the more politically expedient position,
however, was not to support skilled craft unions, but to claim concern for the common
laborer-and to appeal to racial prejudice by railing against the immigrants from Italy,
Hungary, and other southern European countries. See Erickson, supra note 117, at
139-66. Whatever the truth about the unexpressed motivations of Representative Foran
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Did Congress choose language that would limit its remedy to that
problem? Assuredly not. Why did neither the Senate nor the House
amend the bill to narrow its scope, since the breadth of the proposed
language was brought to the attention of Congress? The legislative his-
tory suggests that there was, at least at some stages in the consideration of
the bill, insufficient time to make the necessary changes.1 8 6 It also sug-
gests, repeatedly, that neither the drafters nor the supporters thought the
bill was well-drafted to accomplish its purposes. The bill was repeatedly
referred to as "crude," and at least one Senator suggested that lawyers
would laugh to see what had been written. The bill was amended repeat-
edly to ensure exceptions for a small number of categories of immi-
grants-personal or domestic servants, personal friends or members of
an individual's family, artists-but the only broad amendment offered-
to change "labor or service" to "manual labor or manual service"-would
not in any event have matched the language of the bill to the purposes
expressed. Indeed, it was clear when the breadth was discussed that sup-
porters were satisfied with language that reached all kinds of workers-if
they were being imported in the fashion described. Perhaps one reason for the
failure to amend is the difficulty of drafting language that would do what
Congress intended, that would draw a workable line between the prob-
lematic-workers brought in, often in large numbers, to damage the posi-
tion of American labor-and the acceptable-voluntary immigrants com-
ing to America, with or without promise of employment, to better their
own lives and incidentally to contribute to the society they were joining.
So Brewer was right when he said Congress did not intend the Act to
exclude Dr. Warren, though not simply because he was a "brain toiler"
rather than a manual laborer, as Brewer wrote.187 There was no problem
with mass importation of foreign ministers to undermine the positions
and wages of American clerics,1 8 8 the problem Congress sought to ad-
and the reasons for labor concern, the Senate and House justified its passage of the anti-
contract labor provision by reference largely to the problems of unskilled labor, though
their arguments-and the language of the Act-encompass both skilled and unskilled
workers.
186. This argument was made both in the first session of Congress, when the Senate
sought but failed to pass the measure in the very last days, and in the second session, when
the bill was brought up some two weeks before final adjournment. It is true, of course, that
between June 1884 and February 1885, there was quite sufficient time to draft any relevant
amendments, but there is no indication why that was not done, especially in view of the
Senate Report's suggestion that an amendment would be made but for lack of time.
187. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464 (1892).
188. There was only one reference to the labor problems of ministers in the legislative
history, and it seems more strategic than based either in fact or in true concern over
competition from foreign clergy. In support of his proposal to add an exemption for "any
organization of musicians or orchestras" to the already proposed amendment making the
Act inapplicable to ministers, Senator Plumb argued that musicians are
certainly... as much entitled to come in as ordained ministers of the gospel, for I
have no doubt the Senator would testify of his own knowledge that the ministers
of the gospel in this country are the poorest paid of all the people who labor, and
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dress, and when confronted with the question whether the Act should
cover circumstances like Holy Trinity Church's arrangements with Dr.
Warren, Congress without any dissenting voices determined it should not.
If legislative intent as reflected in legislative history should be considered
in construing the statutory words-admittedly a conclusion not univer-
sally shared 18 9-then the circumstances leading to passage of the Alien
Contract Labor Act provide ample support for limiting, as Brewer did,
the extremely broad language of the Act.
III. JUDcES: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF HOLY
TRN'TY C-URCH-
The Holy Trinity Church opinion is frequently cited, both in treatises
and in case law, for its articulation of the proposition that "a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."19 0 As Vermeule
notes, "[m]uch of the judicial and academic commentary on legislative
history and interpretive theory in recent years thus takes Holy Trinity as
the starting point for discussion.., of non-textualist approaches to statu-
tory interpretation," providing "crucial premises" for prominent statutory
interpretation cases decided by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.191
Just why Holy Trinity Church has become the source of wisdom on this
point is something of a mystery, however. As is clear in both contempora-
neous commentary and cases, the principle itself-that literal text should
be controlled by the spirit of the statute and the intention of those draft-
ing it-was well accepted when Holy Trinity Church was decided in 1892.
Matthew Bacon's A New Abridgement of the Law, for example, published in
1876, notes that "[a] thing which is within the letter of a statute is not
if ministers of the gospel from England, Germany, France, and all the world are
to come in to compete with our two or three or four hundred dollar per annum
preachers, I think it is straining the matter a great deal, and it would not put any
more strain on it to let in these orchestras.
21 Cong. Rec. 10,468 (1890). The competition between American clerics and those from
abroad was also referenced in District Attorney Walker's argument before the circuit court
on behalf of the prosecution. See supra text accompanying note 74. Ministers from
abroad "coming in" to compete with local clergy is in any event a far cry from systematic
importation by prospective employers in an effort to undermine wages.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 240-248.
190. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459. A recent search using Westlaw's
KeyCite service revealed citations to Holy Trinity Church for this proposition in 327 cases
and 160 law review articles. Search of Wesdaw (May 10, 2000) (Keycite search on 143 U.S.
457). There were an additional 174 case citations and 57 law review references to Holy
Trinity Church for the holding that a court construing a statute will consider the evil being
addressed by the legislature in enacting the statute, in part by looking at contemporaneous
events and the situation pressed upon the attention of the legislature. See id. According
to KeyCite, the average number of citations to a Supreme Court case from the year in
which Holy Trinity Church was decided is 55.6.
191. See Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1836.
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within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers."1 9 2 In
his 1871 treatise, Sir Fortunatus Dwarris cites this as one of the rules of
statutory construction in American law. 19 3 J.G. Sutherland, in the 1891
edition of Statutes and Statutory Construction, cites instances in which the
intention of the legislature prevailed over the precise language of the
statute.19 4 Numerous cases, in the United States Supreme Court and else-
where, recited the same or a similar proposition well before Brewer did so
in Holy Trinity Church.195 As one court expressly acknowledged almost
half a century earlier:
[T] he literal interpretation of an act is not always that which
either reason or the law approves. The inartificial manner in
which many of our statutes are framed, the inaptness of expres-
sions frequently used, and the want of perspicuity and precision
not unfrequently met with, often require the court to look less
at the letter or words of the statute, than at the context, the
subject-matter, the consequences and effects, and the reason
and spirit of the law, in endeavoring to arrive at the will of the
law giver. 19 6
Moreover, when District Attorney Walker first contemplated a suit against
Holy Trinity Church, he realized immediately that he would encounter
arguments that the spirit of the act should overcome literal application of
the statute, confirming that the doctrine was well known at the time.
Brewer was quite right when he called the proposition that spirit and in-
tention may trump express words "a familiar rule" that has "often been
asserted." 19
7
192. Matthew Bacon, 9 A New Abridgement of the Law 247 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W.
Johnson & Co. 1876).
193. See Sir Fortunatus Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes: Their Rules of
Construction 144 (Albany, William Gould & Sons 1871).
194. See J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 322 (1891).
195. See, e.g., Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707, 724 (1887); Kirk v. Hamilton, 102
U.S. 68, 77 (1880); Jones v. Guaranty & Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622, 626 (1879);
Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Galveston R.R. Co. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 742 (1875);
Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. 374, 380 (1874); Thompson v. State, 20 Ala. 54, 62 (1852);
Woodruff v. State, 3 Ark. 285, 296 (1841); Shillaber v. Waldo, 1 Haw. 21, 38 (1847); Brown
v. Thompson, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 538, 539 (1879); Inhabitants of Gray v. County Comm'rs,
22 A. 376, 377-78 (Me. 1891); New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern R.R. Co. v.
Hemphill, 35 Miss. 17, 21 (1858); State ex rel. Missouri Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. King, 44 Mo.
283, 285 (1869); Associates of the Jersey Co. v. Davison, 29 N.J.L. 415, 424 (N.J. 1860);
Thompson v. Egbert, 17 N.J.L. 459, 463, 465-66 (N.J. 1840); Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M.
34, 46 (1853); Keith v. Quinney, I Or. 364, 367 (1861); Eshleman's Appeal, 74 Pa. 42, 47
(1873); Levinz v. Will, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 430, 434-35 (Pa. 1789); Taylor v. McGill, 74 Tenn.
294, 300 (1880); Chalmers and Als v. Funk & Son, 76 Va. 717, 722 (1882); Orange and
Alexandria R.R. Co. v. City Council of Alexandria, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 176 (1867); Brown v.
Gates, 15 W. Va. 131, 165 (1879).
196. Thompson v. State, 20 Ala. at 62.
197. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 132 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). Indeed,
Brewer was so comfortable with this "familiar rule" that he chose to cite no authority for it.
One writer disapproved of this "familiar rule" in his 1848 treatise, but even he
acknowledged its widespread adoption. "The duty of the judge," he said, "is to adhere to
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Brewer himself had relied upon this concept when deciding cases as
a justice on the Kansas Supreme Court between 1870 and 1884. He ar-
ticulated the thought most fully in Intoxicating Liquor Cases,198 a consolida-
tion of eight separate prosecutions of druggists for selling various concoc-
tions in violation of a state statute barring the sale of intoxicating liquors
except under specified circumstances. The broad language of the stat-
ute, including in its sweep "all other liquors or mixtures thereof, by
whatever name called, that will produce intoxication,"1 9 9 literally in-
cluded the sale of items such as cologne, bay rum, extract of lemon, and
tincture of gentian, even if sold for medicinal or cosmetic purposes. The
cardinal rule of interpretation, Brewer said, is that legislative intent gov-
erns20 0 and "[ t]he letter does not always express the intent."20 1 Citing a
New York case and Bacon's Abridgement of the Laws, Brewer noted that "'a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless it be within the intention of the makers; and such construction
ought to be put upon it as does not suffer it to be eluded.'"202 Armed
with such principles, the court ruled that certain preparations, like co-
logne, bay rum, essence of lemon, paregoric, and tinctures, would not be
considered intoxicating liquors under the statute, despite the breadth
and clarity of the statutory language. 20
3
the legal text, as his sole guide" even "where the case, though within the mischief, is not
clearly within the meaning; or where the words fall short of the intent,-or go beyond
it .... " E. Fitch Smith, Commentaries on Statute and Constitutional Law 588-89 (1848).
"But," he acknowledged, "this, unfortunately, has not been the practice." Id. Instead of
legislatures being forced by judges to do their duty and amend unsatisfactory statutes, "it
has been left to able judges to invade its province, and to arrogate to themselves the lofty
privilege of correcting abuses and introducing improvements. The rules are thus left in
the breasts of the judges, instead of being put upon a right footing by legislative
enactment." Id. at 591.
198. 25 Kan. 524, 532-36 (1881).
199. Id. at 532.
200. See id. at 533. Several of Brewer's earlier cases similarly noted the primacy of
legislative intent. See State v. Bancroft, 22 Kan. 130, 147 (1879); City of Emporia v. H.E.
Norton, 16 Kan. 236, 239 (1876).
201. Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. at 533.
202. Id. (citing Holmes v. Carley, 31 N.Y. 289 (1865)); Bacon, supra note 192, at 247.
203. It is worth noting, in light of Brewer's later disquisition on the wisdom and
validity of a broad statutory interpretation in Holy Trinity Church, that he interjected in the
Intoxicating Liquor Cases his own personal evaluation of the merits and validity of the
legislature's seemingly broad statutory prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors:
And, speaking for himself alone, the writer of this opinion does not hesitate to say
that such a construction, if imperatively demanded by the language used, would
carry the statute beyond the power of the legislature. I do not think the
legislature can prohibit the sale or use of any article whose sale or use involves no
danger to the general public. The habits, the occupation, the food, the drink, the
life of the individual, are matters of his own choice and determination, and can
be abridged or changed by the majority speaking through the legislature only
when the public safety, the public health, or the public protection requires it.
25 Kan. at 534. As in Holy Trinity Church, where questions of constitutionality also lurked in
the background, Brewer did not reach the constitutional issue, but instead concluded that
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If the principle that spirit should take precedence over literal lan-
guage was well-accepted in 1892, perhaps the prominence of Holy Trinity
Church arises from Brewer's application of the principle-how he deter-
mined the spirit of the statute. Of the three sources Brewer consulted,
two are unremarkable. First, he looked at the title of the Act, not "to add
to or take from the body of the statute," but to "help to interpret its
meaning." 20 4 In doing so, he followed traditional doctrine urging consid-
eration of other portions of the statutory text, including especially the
title. 20 5 Next, he considered "the evil which [the Act] is designed to rem-
edy;.., contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was
pressed upon the attention of the legislative body."20 6 Here, again,
Brewer broke no new ground.20 7
"the legislature never intended such a sweeping prohibition," and dismissed the
prosecutions. Id.
204. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1892). The
title was "An act to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under
contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States. . . ." Brewer read this as
"[o]bviously" aimed at the manual laborer, "as distinguished from that of the professional
man." Id. at 463. While the use of "labor" in the title was somewhat different than its use
in the statute itself, which barred migration of those under contract "to perform labor or
service of any kind in the United States," id. at 458, it is hard to see the connection to
manual labor as "obvious," as Brewer argued. Whatever may be said about how Brewer
interpreted the title, the fact that he used the title to construe other language in the Act
was well-accepted doctrine. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 380 (1874); United States v.
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 385,
386 (1805); County of Perry v. County of Jefferson, 94 Ill. 214, 220 (1879); Reithmiller v.
People, 6 N.W. 667, 668 (Mich. 1880); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Albert, 39 Mo. 181, 183
(1866); Halderman's Appeal, 104 Pa. 251, 251 (1883); Mundt v. Sheboygan & Fond du Lac
R.R Co., 31 Wis. 451, 451 (1872). But see United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72,
82 (1875) ("the title of an act, especially in congressional legislation, furnishes little aid in
the construction of it, because the body of the act, in so many cases, has no reference to
the matter specified in the title"; in this case, however, the title "truly discloses the general
purpose of Congress").
206. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 463. Brewer quoted a trial court opinion by
District Court Judge, later Supreme Court Justice, Henry Billings Brown, which cited the
'motives and history of the" Alien Contract Labor Act as "matters of common knowledge":
It had become the practice for large capitalists in this country to contract with
their agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant and servile
class of foreign laborers .... The effect of this was to break down the labor
market, and to reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the level of
the assisted immigrant.
United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795, 798 (E.D. Mich. 1886). As was typical in articulating the
evil that legislation was meant to address, Justice Brown cited no authority, though he
echoed the purposes expressed repeatedly in the congressional debates.
207. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.K Co., 91 U.S. at 79; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
114 (1866) (noting that the "motives that must have operated with the legislature in
passing [a law] are proper to be considered" when construing the statute). For another
example, see State ex rel. New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nicholls:
A rule of statutory construction, the soundness of which is attested by long use,
and the frequent and continuing approbation of judicial tribunals, is that the
intent of the law-maker is to be ascertained by inquiring what was his motive in
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Finally, Brewer cited the Senate and House reports and their refer-
ences both to the evils being addressed by the legislation and the desire
to have "labor and service" interpreted to mean "cheap unskilled la-
bor."20 8 As Vermeule acknowledges, the Holy Trinity Church decision was
not the first instance in which the Supreme Court turned to some form of
legislative history to determine legislative intent in construing a stat-
ute. 20 9 In 1874, in Blake v. National Banks,210 the Court had relied upon
the journals of the House and Senate to overcome the literal meaning of
a statutory text, but only by reference to the sequence of amendments to
the bill, not through using substantive statements appearing in the legis-
lative history. In 1878, inJennison v. Kirk,2 11 the Court went further, con-
sulting the statement of a bill's author. Such history could not control
the statute's interpretation, the Court said, but might be used to indicate
"the probable intention of Congress." 212 Other courts, both state and
federal, had also, on occasion, consulted a variety of sources of legislative
history in construing state and federal legislation.2 13 In his 1896 treatise,
citing precedents predating Holy Trinity Church, Henry Campbell Black
noted that opinions of individual members of Congress could not be ac-
cepted as binding authority for a particular interpretation, but could be
legislating-what was the mischief sought to be avoided or remedied, and what
the object or good to be attained. Contemporaneous history may be resorted
to... in order to discover the meaning and scope of the law itself.
30 La. Ann. 980, 982-83 (1878). It is worth noting that in most opinions in which courts
determine the evil addressed by the legislature by discussing the historical circumstances
that led to passage of an enactment, the opinions rarely cite any authority for their factual
recitations. In effect, they declare the history by "judicial fiat" or "authoritative revelation,"
techniques identified and discussed by Alfred Kelly in his influential article on the use of
history by the United States Supreme Court. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An
Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 119, 122-23.
208. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464-65.
209. Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1836 & n.14.
210. 90 U.S. 307 (1874).
211. 98 U.S. 453 (1878).
212. Id. at 460.
213. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 690, 690 (1884) (quoting committee
reports and holding that such reports may be used to show the intent of both houses of
Congress in passing a statute); Ex parte Farley, 40 F. 66, 69 (W.D. Ark. 1889) (citing speech
by chair of House committee when presenting conference report: "The statements of
those who had charge of the law, made to the legislative body passing it, as to its meaning
and purpose, are always competent."); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (D. Cal.
1879) (No. 6546) (concluding that statements of members of board of supervisors in
debate on passage of legislation may be used to ascertain the general object of legislation,
though not to explain the meaning of particular terms used); New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 30
La. Ann. at 988 (stating that a court may consult "the discussions attendant upon the
progress of the legislation through its various stages, as well as the projet of the law" in order
to determine the meaning and scope of the law); Maynard v. Johnson, 2 Nev. 541, 547
(1866) (consulting debates recorded in the Congressional Globe to help determine
meaning of the statute); Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 70 (1871) (report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee "furnishes strong evidence of the sense and meaning of the law, as
understood by the legislature itself").
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considered by the interpreter of the statute as one piece of evidence
"tend[ing] to lead the mind to a certain conclusion" about the intent of
the legislature.2 1 4
But authorities like these coexisted with others that cautioned
against the use of legislative history. In United States v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Co., for example, the Supreme Court concluded it was "not at liberty
to recur to the views of individual members in debate, nor to consider the
motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage."21 5 In
Leese v. Clark, the California Supreme Court warned that statements by
certain Senators during discussion "only express the views entertained by
individual members of one body of the national legislature," and others
may have disagreed.2 16 "It is evident that the opinions expressed by indi-
vidual legislators upon the object and effect of particular provisions of an
act under discussion, are entitled to very little weight in the construction
of the act," the court continued. 217 "The intention of the legislature
must be sought in the language of the act-and the object expressed or
apparent on its face-and not by the uncertain light of a legislative dis-
cussion."2 1 8 In his 1891 treatise on statutory construction, Sutherland
noted "occasional . . . judicial reference to declarations of members of
legislative bodies," but said that such aids are but slightly relied upon, and
the general current of authority is opposed to any resort to such aids.2 19
And in contrast to his relatively receptive attitude towards statements by
individual legislators, Henry Campbell Black suggested that committee
reports "cannot be accepted as pertinent evidence of the meaning which
the legislature intended to attach to the statute."220
In the context of such conflicting commentary, Holy Trinity Church
took the rather modest step of referring with approval to two committee
reports, and using them along with "the title of the act, the evil which was
intended to be remedied, [and] the circumstances surrounding the ap-
peal to Congress.... all [of which] concur in affirming that the intent of
Congress was simply to stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labor."2 21
The opinion made no effort to establish any particular authority for the
214. Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of
the Laws 228 (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1896).
215. 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875).
216. 20 Cal. 388, 425 (1862).
217. Id.
218. Id. Similarly, in Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. 144, 156 (1852),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved charging the jury to ignore a proclamation and
message of the Governor, journals of the House of Representatives, and the reports of its
committees in construing a tax statute. Such evidence, the Court said, "was not only of no
value, but it was delusive and dangerous" and in any event showed only that a minority of
House members favored a different position. Id.
219. J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 384 (Chicago, Callaghan
1891).
220. Black, supra note 214, at 226 (citing two English cases and Bank of Pennsylvania,
discussed supra note 218).
221. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892).
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statements of legislators or committees beyond the cumulative effect they
had when considered with other evidence often used for statutory inter-
pretation, and went no further than the prior opinion in Jennison in
counting legislative history as relevant to determining legislative
intent.222
Perhaps the reason Holy Trinity Church is so often cited as creating a
revolution in statutory interpretation is not the principles upon which it
drew, but the fact that the Court used them in this particular case to
ignore the literal language of a statute. 223 It is one thing, after all, to talk
of the "spirit" of a statute in order to choose among plausible understand-
ings of ambiguous language. It is quite another to invoke the spirit to
justify an interpretation in direct conflict with apparently clear language.
Yet Holy Trinity Church was not the first decision to follow legislative intent
rather than the clear letter of a statute, though the literal language was
generally trumped by reference to the legislature's purpose and not by
recourse to the legislative history.22 4 Such decisions were rare before
222. Although Holy Trinity Church was not a departure from prior precedent, it was
Holy Trinity Church that was cited in the years immediately following when the Court looked
at the legislative history of a bill to "place ourselves in the light that Congress enjoyed, look
at things as they appeared to it, and discover its purpose from the language used in
connection with the attending circumstances." Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. J.
Forrest Manning, 186 U.S. 238, 246 (1902) (quoting Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S.
48, 64 (1878), and citing as well Blake v. National Banks, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 307, 309
(1874)). See United States v. St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba Ry. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 318
(1918); Woodward v. de Graffenried, 238 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1915); Binns v. United States,
194 U.S. 486, 495 (1904) (noting that, although debates in Congress generally are not
appropriate sources of information to determine the congressional intent, "yet it is also
true that we have examined the reports of the committees of either body with a view of
determining the scope of statutes passed on the strength of such reports"); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 360 (1897) (White, J., dissenting). Perhaps
these citations marked the beginnings of the prominence of Holy Trinity Church as the
seeming foundation for non-textualist interpretation for both its supporters and
detractors.
223. See Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1836 & n.15 ("Holy Trinity was the first majority
opinion of the Supreme Court to give legislative history sufficient weight to trump contrary
statutory text.").
224. See, e.g., Jones v. Guaranty & Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622, 626-27 (1879)
(construing statute to permit company to mortgage debt before incurring it, though literal
language would not allow it, because legislative purpose of statute would be served by this
kind of mortgage); Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold & Silver Mining Co., 93 U.S. 634, 638
(1876) (statute grants to state specified sections of land for support of schools; although
literal language would support plaintiffs claim to land he received from state grant, Court
supports defendant's claim deriving from United States grant by construing statute
according to the spirit and intent of the law derived from "considering the necessity for
[the law], and the causes which induced its enactment"); Thompson v. State, 20 Ala. 54,
61-62 (1852) (statute forbids state from opening a new road "through any enclosure whilst
there is a crop growing in the same"; court creates exception where individual planted
small isolated patch of wheat in path of already planned road, although literal language
would apply); Maxwell v. Collins, 8 Ind. 38, 39-40 (1856) (statute requires any lawsuit be
brought in township where defendant resides; despite breadth of language, court
concludes requirement applies only when suit is brought in defendant's county of
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1892, to be sure, and some-though by no means all-might be charac-
terized as more narrowly drawn efforts to construe statutes to avoid ab-
surd results, a doctrine that even an avowed textualist like Justice Scalia
endorses. 225 Nonetheless, Holy Trinity Church was not unique, either in
the general doctrine it espoused or the degree to which it "ignored" the
statutory text.
Why, then, has Holy Trinity Church become the focus of so much of
the debate about the validity of non-literal interpretation? 226 Perhaps it
was the confluence of all of these features-invocation of the spirit of an
act, reference to a committee report, overcoming the literal meaning of
seemingly plain text-in a single case that led subsequent courts to turn
residence, since intent of legislature was to prevent justices in the county seat from
monopolizing court business); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 12 S.W. 132, 132 (Ky. 1889)
(finding that though letter of the act prohibiting all sale of liquor except by a physician
would bar sale by druggist under doctor's prescription, consideration of legislative intent
leads to different result); Brown v. Thompson, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 538, 538-39 (1879)
(statute permits recovery of money by "any person" who loses to another in gaming;
though letter of statute would mandate recovery by one who sets up gambling business and
loses money to customers, such compensation would violate legislative purpose and should
not be considered within the statute); Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410, 413 (1855) (statute
broadly prohibiting banks from purchasing and holding land does not prevent bank from
satisfying its lien by buying and selling property; "the policy of the statute was doubtless to
restrain and prohibit reckless expansions in banking, and speculations in property," not to
prevent bank from collecting debts); State ex rel. Missouri Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. King, 44
Mo. 283, 284-85 (1869) (statute says life insurance company cannot do business in state
unless it has specified amount invested in certain assets, including notes of bonds secured
by liens on "unencumbered real estate worth at least double the amount loaned"; court
adds requirement that property be in Missouri because need for superintendent to have
basis for assessing value of property must have been in minds of legislature when enacting
law); Thompson v. Egbert, 17 N.J.L. 459, 462-63 (1840) (statute requires surviving wife to
elect within six months between her dower rights and property devised by husband; despite
breadth of language, in order to effectuate intent of legislature to protect widow, court
finds exception where, after such election, widow would be evicted from devised land due
to debts on estate); Taylor v. McGill, 74 Tenn. 294, 300-02 (1880) (provision tolling statute
of limitations while person to be sued is out of state held not to apply where suit would be
brought against absent administratrix; plaintiffs could have sued heirs or property itself in
her absence, so purpose of statute not served by extending time to file suit).
225. See Scalia, supra note 16, at 23-24. Absurdity, of course, is in the eyes of the
beholder. No doubtJustice Brewer, at least, thought the application of the Alien Contract
Labor Act to Dr. Warren would be absurd.
226. See, e.g., supra notes 14-19, 190-191 and accompanying text; Kenneth R.
Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies ofJustices Scalia and Breyer and the Use
of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 161, 168 (1996) ("By
citing Holy Trinity Church, a judge signals he or she is about to detour from the plain
meaning of the statute."); Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory
Interpretation in Comparative Perspective, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 513, 514 (1996) (reviewing
Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers
eds., 1991)); William Funk, Faith in Texts-Justice Scalia's Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution: Apostasy for the Rest of Us?, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 825, 842-43 (1997)
(reviewing Antonin Scalia et al., A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Laws
(1997)); Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1295, 1307-09
(1997).
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to it, rather than other opinions, as a source of authority. Perhaps it was
also the prominence of the statute being interpreted, the relative notori-
ety of the proceeding against the Church, and the fact that Brewer cited
no precedent either when he referred to the "familiar rule .. .often
asserted" that spirit may supercede letter,22 7 or when he looked to com-
mittee reports to determine legislative intent, leaving Holy Trinity Church
as the only apparent source of authority.
Perhaps it was all these factors that led at least one influential com-
mentary on statutory construction to alter its articulation of interpreta-
tion methodology shortly after the Supreme Court decided Holy Trinity
Church.2 2 8 In the 1891 edition of Sutherland's treatise on statutory con-
struction, resort to legislative materials was not encouraged, although
"when occasion arises for resort to ... extrinsic facts" because of ambigu-
ity, "a court may obtain information from any authentic source. '229 No
mention was made of committee reports, though Sutherland cited to use
of the journals of a legislative body, typically containing procedural infor-
mation about the adoption of an act but little or no substantive commen-
tary from the legislative debates. Only "occasionally" had there been 'ju-
dicial reference to declarations of members of legislative bodies, but such
aids are but slightly relied upon, and the general current of authority is
opposed to any resort to such aids."230 In 1904, in a second edition writ-
ten by John Lewis, 23 1 the rules had changed. The treatise repeated its
disapproval of the use of the "declarations of members," but noted that
"the proceedings of the legislature... may be taken into consideration in
construing the act" and that reports of committees thus had been de-
clared "proper sources of information in ascertaining the intent or mean-
ing" of an act, citing Holy Trinity Church-along with several recent state
cases. 232 It took Henry Campbell Black a bit longer to shift gears. In
1896, he still noted that "[i]t is generally agreed, by both the English and
American courts, that reports or recommendations made to the legisla-
tive bodies by their respective committees in relation to a pending mea-
sure cannot be accepted as pertinent evidence of the meaning which the
legislature intended to attach to the statute," though mentioning one
227. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
228. William Eskridge was the first to note this shift. See Eskridge, Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 22, at 209.
229. Sutherland, supra note 219, at 383.
230. Id. at 384.
231. J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (2d ed. 1904) ("Second
edition byJohn Lewis"). A measure of the emerging importance and activity in the field of
statutory interpretation are the six thousand new cases, almost two hundred fifty new
sections, and seven hundred pages added in the second edition, which appeared only
thirteen years after the first. See John Lewis, Preface to 1 Statutes and Statutory
Construction, supra, at iii.
232. 2 id. § 470, at 879-80, 882. It is worth noting that none of the state cases cited by
Sutherland/Lewis cited to Holy Trinity Church, suggesting again that the Supreme Court's
decision may have been in keeping with trends already appearing in other courts.
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state case holding otherwise. 233 By 1911, he noted that "the prevalent
judicial opinion is now the other way," though without citing Holy Trinity
Church for that proposition. 234 These treatises are likely themselves to
have been influential in changing statutory interpretation methodology
and in bringing attention to Holy Trinity Church in the process. 23 5
The best explanation of the notoriety of Holy Trinity Church may lie,
however, not in the nature of the Court's consideration of legislative in-
tent, but in the final portion of the opinion in which Brewer waxed elo-
quent about the Christian nature of the United States and the impossibil-
ity of believing that Congress would have intended "to make it a
misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the services of a
Christian minister residing in another nation."236 Both supporters and
critics of non-textualist interpretation may be excused for believing that
Brewer and the Court were not truly convinced of the correctness of his
articulated understanding of legislative intent, but instead stretched the
facts and the law to reach a desired outcome. Moreover, Brewer's gran-
diloquent speech describing in great detail the many references to Chris-
tianity in a host of official and unofficial documents appears so overblown
and personal, 2 37 at least to modem sensibilities, as to cast doubt on the
233. Black, supra note 214, at 226. Opinions of individual members also could not
serve as authority on a matter of interpretation, according to Black, though they might be
considered as evidence of the history of the times and for the force of the argument made.
See id. at 228-29.
234. Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of
the Laws 311 (2d ed. 1911). Use of legislative history was still limited to circumstances
where there is "real doubt" about the meaning of the law, however. Id.
235. Although Holy Trinity Church did not mark a complete departure from prior
practice, as some commentators have claimed, it was part of a gradual shift towards making
more use of legislative history. William Popkin suggests the change was a "natural
evolution" as judges became more distant from the legislative process and realized they
needed assistance in understanding legislative purpose when before they could simply rely
on their knowledge of the public history of a statute. See William D. Popkin, Statutes in
Court 122 (1999). William Eskridge argues that reliance on legislative history allowed
judges to escape charges of judicial activism even as they imposed conservative and
restrictive interpretations on legislation in the Lochner era. See Eskridge, Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 22, at 205-10.
236. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
237. Brewer's personal commitment to Christianity grew naturally from his
upbringing and was a constant theme throughout his adult life. Brewer's father was a
Congregational minister who spent a number of years as a missionary. See Michael J.
Brodhead, DavidJ. Brewer: The Life of a Supreme CourtJustice, 1837-1910, at 1 (1994).
Brewer was born in Smyrna, Asia Minor, during one such missionary tour. As a young
lawyer recently arrived in Kansas Territory, Brewer helped to establish the First
Congregational Church and served as both Bible class teacher and Sunday school
superintendent. As an Associate Justice of the Kansas Supreme Court in 1883, in an
address on "The Scholar in Politics" to graduates of Washburn College, Brewer spoke of
"the teachings of Christ" as the "bases of modem republican institutions." Id. at 48. That
same year, in language he would borrow almost ten years later in Holy Trinity Church, he
noted in one of his Kansas Supreme Court opinions that the United States was "a Christian
commonwealth." Wyandotte County Comm'rs v. First Presbyterian Church of Wyandotte,
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entire judgment of which it is a part.23 8 Perhaps it is that which leads one
commentator to conclude that "Holy Trinity Church is the case you always
cite when the statutory text is hopelessly against you .... The tactic of
relying upon the case does sometimes resemble the 'hail Mary' pass in
1 P. 109, 112 (Kan. 1883). When Brewer arrived in Washington to join the United States
Supreme Court in 1890, he also "united" with the First Congregational Church of
Washington and, addressing the congregation one week later on the occasion of the
twenty-fifth anniversary of that Church, noted his belief that "the law and the gospel ought
always to go together." Brodhead, supra, at 128.
In 1892, after declaring on behalf of the United States Supreme Court that the United
States was a Christian nation, Brewer cited his own opinion as authority for that
proposition in an address to the annual meeting of the American Home Missionary
Society. "This is a Christian nation," he said. "Such is the declaration of your highest
court." Id. at 128-29. Brewer later used similar language in his Haverford lectures. See
supra note 13. He also occasionally used biblical references in his own opinions. For
example, in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co., 189 U.S. 135, 138
(1903), Brewer wrote:
We do not wonder at this observation of the Court of Appeals, as we find from the
record that the plaintiff filed in that court thirty-seven assignments of error
covering seventeen printed pages, and the defendant thirty-nine such
assignments. It may be true, as the Scriptures have it, that "in the multitude of
counsellors there is safety," but it is also true that in a multitude of assignments of
error there is danger.
See also Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Mercer County, 170 U.S. 593, 602 (1898) (Brewer,J.)
(construing a statute by comparing the language to the first sentence of Bunyan's Pilgrim's
Progress, "[t]hat book which is said to have had a wider circulation than any except the
Bible").
238. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 474
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he central support for the Court's
ultimate conclusion that Congress did not intend the law to cover Christian ministers is its
lengthy review of the 'mass of organic utterances' establishing that 'this is a Christian
nation' "). In this regard, Brewer's litany is suggestive ofJustice Harry Blackmun's paean to
baseball in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64 (1972), upholding baseball's exemption
from the antitrust laws, which was criticized as an incorrect decision made under the
influence of a romanticized devotion to the sport. See, e.g., Bob Woodward & Scott
Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court 190 (1979) (noting that Justice
Brennan was surprised by Blackmun's draft opinion; he "thought Blackmun had been in
the library researching the abortion cases, not playing with baseball cards"); Paul Campos,
Silence and the Word, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1139, 1142, 1143 (1993) (calling Blackmun's list
of baseball greats a "strange chant" that provides a "transrational justification" for his
opinion and that is "reminiscent of nothing so much as that portion of the canon of the
Catholic mass in which the priest intones the names of thirty-seven saints"); Sanford
Levinson, Why Select a Favorite Case?, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1198 n.10 (1996) (referring to
the "(in)famous Part I" of Blackmun's opinion containing his list of greatest players);
Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1421,
1434-35 (1995) (criticizing Blackmun's expression of personal views in Flood v. Kuhn and
other cases as "embarrassing performances"); Stephen F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v.
Kuhn, 12 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 169, 173-74 (1995) (referring to the failure of
Justices White and Burger to join Blackmun's ode to baseball and to off-the-record
comments that "ridiculed" Blackmun for the content of Part I, and noting that such
criticism has obscured the merits of the decision taken in the context of its times).
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football."2 39 Although the Supreme Court's reading of the Alien Con-
tract Labor Act finds ample support in the legislative history and in the
purposes Congress sought to address by the law, Holy Trinity Church may
forever be remembered as the case in which the Court heralded its will-
ingness to ignore statutory text in favor of a misguided effort to reach
what it perceived to be a just result-and did so by communing with
spirits.
IV. ]EVELA 7io0. THE MEANING OF THE HISTORY
What should a court do when faced with the question raised in Holy
Trinity Church? Should the operative and seemingly broad language of a
statute be controlling, irrespective of the content of the legislative his-
tory? "New textualists" like Scalia and Vermeule 240 would hold Congress
to the words it used, whatever the content of the legislative history, be-
cause of the judiciary's institutional incompetence to determine the true
intent of Congress. Even if persuaded of the "true" Congressional intent,
and of the possibility of determining legislative meaning in this fashion,
they might still enforce the words that Congress actually used because to
do otherwise would permit Congress to legislate without completing the
required process for enactment of legislation. Reading the words of the
statute differently than they were written, they argue, would promote just
the kind of sloppy drafting that was evident-and described by the draft-
ers themselves-in the Alien Contract Labor Act.
But the textualist approach prevents a court from attempting to ful-
fill what it can determine of legislative intent expressed elsewhere than in
the statutory language. Although it may be technically impossible to de-
termine the specific legislative intent as to a specific issue 241-whether
clergy were meant to be excluded from the ban on importation of con-
tract labor, for example-the thorough review of the legislative history of
239. Frickey, supra note 19, at 247. The name of the case appears almost equally
evocative. At the oral argument in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429
(1992), Justice Stevens asked Solicitor General Starr if "this is a plain language case or a
Holy Trinity" case. Starr replied that it was "somewhere in between .... [T] here certainly
is a 'spirit' to the compromise, but my argument is going to be grounded on the structure
of this statute ...not some broad, vague, spiritual context . . . ." Transcript of Oral
Argument, Robertson, available in 1991 WL 636570, at *4-*5. Observers-including
"[s]easoned lawyers and reporters"-were apparently puzzled by the references:
[T]he courtroom was abuzz.... Surely, some said, the reference was meant as a
metaphor to suggest a bright line of separation between the three branches of
government. Others,just ascertain, said it was some kind of inside joke akin to a
"Hail Mary pass," suggesting that the Court would need to pray for divine
inspiration or luck to figure out what Congress meant in the statute.
Tony Mauro, Courtside: Stevens' Holy Trinity, Legal Times, Dec. 9, 1991, at 10. Justice
Scalia, one supposes, would agree with the latter characterization. In any event, the
invocation of the "spirit" of an act together with the reference to the Holy Trinity in the
title of the case seems irresistible.
240. The term is from Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 184, at 623.
241. See id. at 642-44 (the "realist criticism").
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the Alien Contract Labor Act demonstrates that it is possible to under-
stand the general purposes being served by a statute, which helps to en-
sure a more complete and historically accurate understanding of the law.
Ignoring legislative history also prevents the interpreter from under-
standing the context in which the legislator used the words written into
the statutory text. In construing the words of the Alien Contract Labor
Act as clearly proscribing the importation of any kind of laborer, Justice
Scalia ignores not only the legislators' statements of statutory purpose
and intent, but also the history of labor and immigration that, even with-
out the legislative history of the Act, helps inform our understanding of
the way in which the legislators used "labor" and "service" in the stat-
ute. 242 While one cannot avoid being affected by modern contexts and
perceptions when attempting to understand legislative history,243 the
same is true when attempting to understand the bare statutory words
themselves. The legislative history at least may alert the interpreter to the
possible complexities of the language used in the statute. Even if the
proper aim of statutory interpretation is to seek "objective meaning"
rather than "subjective intent,"244 knowing the legislative and other his-
tory surrounding enactment inevitably affects conclusions about what
those words-even words as seemingly clear as "labor or service of any
kind"-"objectively" mean.
Finally, reading statutory words as written, without recourse to legis-
lative history, amplifies the inevitable vagaries of the legislative process.
The history of the Alien Contract Labor Act demonstrates that, even in
simpler times, Congress proved incapable of being clear and thorough in
its statutory drafting, though it recognized and acknowledged the crudity
of its language. A textualist approach will not likely result in better stat-
utes that accurately reflect legislative intent, but instead in unintended
consequences resulting from the realities of legislative work. 245
Critics of the use of legislative history also contend that the sheer
volume of legislative history material and the resource limitations on
242. See Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 24, at 1517-18 (noting that Scalia's
reading of the statute is ahistorical and pointing to contemporaneous dictionary
definitions and judicial construction of similar words in the Chinese Exclusion Act as
providing some historical context that Scalia ignores). It is worth noting that Holy Tinity
Church was one of many cases in which the courts narrowly construed the Alien Contract
Labor Act (and related laws) so as not to "unduly trespass upon the traditional American
policy that extends a welcome to all." Samuel P. Orth, The Alien Contract Labor Law, 22
Pol. Sci. Q. 49, 60 (1907). The courts required great specificity in complaints brought
under the Act, often construed the exceptions for certain classes of immigrants broadly,
refused to infer the existence of a contract from suggestive facts, and declined to apply the
statute to those who did not enter the country with intent to remain. See id. at 52-60; see
also Erickson, supra note 117, at 171-76.
243. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 184, at 644-46 (the "historicist
criticism").
244. Scalia, supra note 16, at 29.
245. Cf. Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 24, at 1551 (noting chaotic nature of
legislative process).
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judges and lawyers inevitably will lead to unacceptable levels of error if
judges purport to use legislative history to interpret statutes.2 46 Nor, they
say, can a judge solve these problems by simply using caution, restricting
use of legislative history to arguably more authoritative sources such as
committee reports and sponsor statements, or seeking only the purpose,
not specific intent, in the legislative materials. 247 Holy Trinity Church is
offered as a prime example of the failure of such strategies, with Brewer
relying on "misleading committee reports," "overlook[ing] policy rea-
sons ... that supported a legal prohibition broader" than what was ini-
tially imposed, and "misapprehend [ing] the questions at issue" because
of his lack of expertise in understanding the legislative policy discus-
sions. 248 The exploration of the history of the Alien Contract Labor Act
demonstrates, however, that Brewer's analysis, while not entirely correct,
more accurately reflected the policy concerns of Congress than would a
literal interpretation of the statutory words. As suggested by William Es-
kridge in his effort to analyze the costs and benefits of consulting legisla-
tive history,249 the price of excluding legislative history may well be to
prevent judges from viewing the statutory language as the legislators saw
it, making the interpretation less, not more, democratic. Failing to con-
sult the history behind enactment of the Alien Contract Labor Act would
have left the Court interpreting the text in a vacuum, with little to con-
nect the words to the national labor and immigration policies emerging
from Congressional deliberations in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. Understanding that kind of political and social context for a
statute seems vital to implementing the democratic will as expressed
through legislative action, and paying attention to legislative history
seems indispensable to achieving that understanding.
No doubt the debate will continue about whether legislative history
ought to be used in construing statutes, and the full history of the Holy
Trinity Church case may change few minds about either the narrow ques-
tion of the meaning of labor or service in the Alien Contract Labor Act or
the broader methodological question. It should at least serve to demon-
strate, however, that Brewer-who construed the statute, we should re-
member, only seven years after its passage, within memory of the political
circumstances that led to its enactment 2 5 0-had a firmer foundation for
246. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 16, at 31-37; Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1860-77.
247. See Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1877-85.
248. Id. at 1881, 1885.
249. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but
Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1301, 1321-23 (1998).
250. It is worth noting that in 1886, just a year before the prosecution of Holy Trinity
Church began, the federal court in Michigan described the purpose of the Alien Contract
Labor Act without any citation of authority, stating:
The motives and history of the act are matters of common knowledge. It had
become the practice for large capitalists in this country to contract with their
agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant and servile class
of foreign laborers, under contracts, by which the employer agreed, upon the one
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his interpretation than has often been suggested, making it more difficult
to view the case as an instance of a judge blithely substituting his own
judgment for the judgment of the legislature. 251 It should no longer be
possible to say, as Justice Kennedy did in his concurrence in Public Citizen
v. United States Department ofJustice, that "the potential of this doctrine to
allowjudges to substitute their personal predilections for the will of Con-
gress is so self-evident from the case which spawned it as to require no
further discussion of its susceptibility to abuse."252 Lawyers and judges
who cite to legislative history may, like Brewer, do a less than thorough
job of exploring that history, sometimes from unfamiliarity with the
whole, sometimes from an excess of zeal in advocacy. This is no more
reason to condemn wholesale any attempt to use legislative history, how-
ever, than to condemn efforts to use case law precedent or to explore
relevant political, social, or economic history, though both are subject to
the same missteps and abuses.25 3 Striving to understand the statutory
words in their broader context is the best way of applying the statute as
written, for it was written at a particular time and place and as the result
of a particular sequence of events and circumstances, and can only be
fully comprehended with that background in mind.
EPILOGUE
In passing the Alien Contract Labor Act, Congress apparently sought
in part to protect cultural institutions in the United States from foreign
workers who had no interest in participating in American democratic so-
hand, to prepay their passage, while, upon the other hand, the laborers agreed to
work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages. The effect of this
was to break down the labor market, and to reduce other laborers engaged in like
occupations to the level of the assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so
flagrant that an appeal was made to congress for relief by the passage of the act in
question, the design of which was to raise the standard of foreign immigrants, and
to discountenance the migration of those who had not sufficient means in their
own hands, or those of their friends, to pay their passage.
United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795, 798 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1886).
251. See Scalia, supra note 16, at 22.
252. 491 U.S. 440, 474 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
253. On the uses and abuses of history (not the legislative kind) in judicial
decisionmaking, see, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995); Peter Charles Hoffer, "Blind to History,"
The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another Look at City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 23 Rutgers L.J. 271 (1992); Kelly, supra note 207; Paul L. Murphy, Time to
Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 Am. Hist. Rev. 64
(1963); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's
Uses of History, 13 J.L. & Pol. 809 (1997); William F. Swindler, Legal History-Unhappy
Hybrid, 55 L. Libr. J. 98 (1962); Patricia Wallace, Comment, Grave-Digging: The Misuse of
History in Aboriginal Rights Litigation, 30 U. Miami Inter-Amer. L. Rev. 489 (1998);
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of History: The Supreme Court's
Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson's Influence on the Patent Law, 39 IDEA 195 (1999);
John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 1169 (1999).
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ciety, who would fail to become citizens, and who, for that reason, "are
certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body-politic." 254 When the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Holy Trinity Church, it no doubt as-
sumed that the Reverend Walpole Warren would not fit such a descrip-
tion. Six weeks after the decision was rendered, however, Dr. Warren
announced his intention to forego becoming a citizen of the United
States. "I have refrained from taking out papers as a citizen of New York
because the city is so wicked and corrupt that I would not wish to be
identified with it, even as a voter," Warren was reported to have said.2 55
The New York Times, which had strongly supported him editorially during
the prosecution of the Church for hiring him, quickly revised its opinion.
Referring to his "high-salaried church," the Times noted in its news cover-
age that the country had "proved attractive enough to him to lure him
from his native land and from which he has shown no purpose to depart
voluntarily."256 In an editorial column, the Times said his statement was a
most astounding declaration" and spoke disparagingly of a clergyman
who accepts a pastorate, presumably for the purpose of doing
good, and then refuses to cast in his lot with his people, and
holds himself aloof from their efforts as good citizens to better
the evil about them! . . .If Mr. Warren had been excluded
[under the contract labor law] upon the ground he himself has
now furnished, we are quite sure that the Republic would have
taken no detriment by his exclusion. 25 7
Although this reaction of the Times overlooked Warren's real contribu-
tions to his adopted country,258 it is a final irony that the spiritual com-
254. 15 Cong. Rec. 5359 (1884), quoted at length at supra text accompanying notes
119-141.
255. E. Walpole Warren An Alien, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1892, at 6. Warren referred
specifically to political corruption in New York ("Until [New York] has rid itself of an
administration that is vile from top to bottom I will remain an alien. The entire municipal
machine, I believe, from Mayor Grant down, is absolutely corrupt."), but may also have
been concerned about other moral lapses. In a reported speech made several years before,
Warren strongly criticized various forms of popular entertainment for their pernicious
influence. See Stage and Dance Denounced, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1888, at 3 ("Don't bring
up your sons and daughters to dance. Thank God, my children do not know how to
dance! ... I shall never set foot in a theatre until all indecent plays and improper dresses
have been banished from the stage and the employees of the theatre are allowed some
time to serve God.").
256. E. Walpole Warren An Alien, supra note 255, at 6.
257. The Alien Preacher, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1892, at 4.
258. Dr. Warren contributed substantially to the American polity as rector of Holy
Trinity Church and later as the first rector of an expanded St. James' Church when the
latter merged with Holy Trinity Church in 1895. Among his other accomplishments,
Warren worked successfully to extend the philanthropic ventures of the Church, which
were a special mission of his original parish, and became known as a powerful preacher
who drew people from all over the city to support that work. See Lindsley, supra note 1, at
48, 56, 62-67. Upon his death, the newsletter of the Church of the Holy Trinity reported
the "great loss" to the Church:
All through his long and busy life his thirst for souls was keen and intense, he had
peculiar ability in speaking to the consciences of men and stirring the depth of
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mitments of the man whom the Supreme Court worked so hard to admit,
and because of whom Congress later amended the statute that
threatened to exclude him, led him to action, that-at least for a
time2 9-raised even more questions about the spirit of the law that chal-
lenged his entry.
their nature; and there are many who can testify that to some word or sermon of
our late Rector they owe their first step toward the light and the beginning of
their new life.
The Chimes (newsletter of the Church of the Holy Trinity), Oct. 1903, at 6-7.
259. Apparently Warren later changed his mind or had simply used his citizenship
status to make a moral and religious point, because he was naturalized before the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York on January 31, 1899. Letter
from A.W. Robinson, supra note 99.
[Vol. 100:901
